[PATCH] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block in End.DT4

The End.DT4 input path decapsulates an IPv4 packet and sends it
directly to ip_route_input() and dst_input(). It therefore bypasses
ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB. The skb still contains
IP6CB data from the outer packet, and IPv6 extension-header offsets
overlap the IPv4 option fields. This can make __ip_options_echo()
copy beyond the allocation for saved options.

Clear IPCB after validating the inner IPv4 header and preserve the
ingress interface as ip_rcv_core() does. This prevents outer IPv6
metadata from being interpreted as inner IPv4 options.

Fixes: 664d6f86868b ("seg6: add support for the SRv6 End.DT4 behavior")
Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and 
validated by Trail of Bits.

Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol gpt-5.5-cyber
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <redacted>
---
Trail of Bits has a reproducer for this bug that triggers a KASAN
slab-out-of-bounds write in __ip_options_echo() and can share if needed.

 net/ipv6/seg6_local.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
index 2b41e4c0d..d03b377f5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c

@@ -1186,6 +1186,9 @@ static int input_action_end_dt4(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)))
 		goto drop;
 
+	memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+	IPCB(skb)->iif = skb->skb_iif;
+
 	skb = end_dt_vrf_core(skb, slwt, AF_INET);
 	if (!skb)
 		/* packet has been processed and consumed by the VRF */