Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/6] net/tls: Bound consecutive no-data records in tls_sw_read_sock()
From: "Chuck Lever" <cel@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-07-29 03:18:10
Also in:
linux-kselftest, linux-nfs
On Tue, Jul 28, 2026, at 9:47 PM, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
On Mon, 20 Jul 2026 10:27:55 -0400 Chuck Lever wrote:quoted
A record that delivers no payload -- an empty TLS 1.3 data record today, a control record once read_sock_rectype() lands -- leaves tls_sw_read_sock() in its loop without advancing the caller's read descriptor. A peer that streams such records keeps the receive loop running, and the socket lock held, for as long as the records arrive. Cap the number of consecutive no-data records consumed per call. The count resets on any record that delivers bytes, so a normal stream is unaffected; a peer supplying only empty records is bounded to TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT iterations before the call returns 0. read_sock consumers treat that as "no progress, re-poll" rather than EOF, so the connection stays up and makes progress once real data arrives. Only tls_sw_read_sock() needs this cap. Its consumers drive the receive loop from kernel context -- a work item or service thread holding the socket lock across the whole call with no return to userspace -- so an unbounded empty-record stream keeps that context and the lock pinned for as long as the flood lasts. The cap supplies the return boundary that a system call would otherwise provide. tls_sw_splice_read() and tls_sw_recvmsg() already have one: they run in the calling task's context, reschedule while draining the socket backlog (cond_resched() in __release_sock()), and drop the socket lock when the call returns. A flood there costs the caller only its own scheduler time, so the cap would add nothing.Is this alluding to PREEMPT_NONE (which for practical purposes is no longer a thing AFAIU)?
No. The cond_resched() reference was a bad way to make the point. What the bound protects is the calling NFSD thread. A client can open multiple connections that all send a continuous stream of empty TLS records, as a denial of service attack. The mechanism added here is an escape hatch for consumers. This patch has already moved to a prerequisite series, intended for “net” instead of “net-next” at Sabrina’s request. https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260726-tls-follow-on-v1-0-99bf4cc1c729@kernel.org (local) -- Chuck Lever