[PATCH net v5 3/3] net/smc: bound the send length to the send buffer in smc_tx_sendmsg()

From: Bryam Vargas <redacted>

On the SMC-D DMB-merge (nocopy) path, smc_cdc_msg_recv_action()
advances conn->sndbuf_space from the peer's wire-controlled consumer
cursor via smc_curs_diff(), which can return more than sndbuf_desc->len;
a forged cursor drives sndbuf_space past the send buffer, and over many
CDC messages overflows the signed counter negative. smc_tx_sendmsg()
reads it as the write space and does a wrap-around copy whose second
chunk is not re-bounded to sndbuf_desc->len, spilling the local
sender's outbound data past the send buffer at a peer-controlled
length: a heap out-of-bounds write. The nearby len > sndbuf_desc->len
test only feeds SMC_STAT_RMB_TX_SIZE_SMALL on the user length; it does
not bound the copy.

Bound the write space to sndbuf_desc->len at the consumer, treating a
negative (sign-overflowed) value as out of range too, so the copy can
never exceed the ring. This enforces the documented
0 <= sndbuf_space <= sndbuf_desc->len invariant where it is race-free
against the CDC tasklet; conforming peers are unaffected.

Fixes: cc0ab806fc52 ("net/smc: adapt cursor update when sndbuf and peer DMB are merged")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
---
 net/smc/smc_tx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/smc/smc_tx.c b/net/smc/smc_tx.c
index 3144b4b1fe29..5916f02060fb 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_tx.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_tx.c

@@ -233,6 +233,19 @@ int smc_tx_sendmsg(struct smc_sock *smc, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 		/* initialize variables for 1st iteration of subsequent loop */
 		/* could be just 1 byte, even after smc_tx_wait above */
 		writespace = atomic_read(&conn->sndbuf_space);
+		/* sndbuf_space is advanced from the peer's wire-controlled
+		 * consumer cursor on the SMC-D DMB-merge path; a forged cursor
+		 * can inflate it past the send buffer, or overflow the signed
+		 * accumulator to a negative value across many CDC messages
+		 * (which a plain "> len" check would miss before the size_t
+		 * cast below turns it huge).  Bound it to the send buffer in
+		 * either case so the wrap-around write cannot run past
+		 * sndbuf_desc->len.  This enforces the documented
+		 * 0 <= sndbuf_space <= sndbuf_desc->len invariant at the
+		 * producer, race-free against the CDC tasklet.
+		 */
+		if (writespace < 0 || writespace > conn->sndbuf_desc->len)
+			writespace = conn->sndbuf_desc->len;
 		/* not more than what user space asked for */
 		copylen = min_t(size_t, send_remaining, writespace);
 		/* determine start of sndbuf */

-- 
2.55.0