On Sun, Jul 12, 2026 at 3:26 PM Yizhou Zhao
[off-list ref] wrote:
A valid SYN that matches a TIME_WAIT socket is redirected to the
listener with a non-zero tcp_tw_isn. tcp_conn_request() deliberately
exempts those requests from normal SYN queue throttling. A peer can
therefore create victim-side TIME_WAIT entries with short connections,
replay valid reopen SYNs, and withhold the final ACK to allocate
request_sock objects outside the listener's normal SYN-flood controls.
Do not send syncookies for this path: tcp_timewait_state_process()
derives tcp_tw_isn from tw_snd_nxt so that a direct reopen uses an ISN
after the prior connection's sequence space. A syncookie ISN is a
hash-derived value and has no such ordering guarantee.
Check the selected listener's SYN queue before descheduling the
TIME_WAIT socket. If it is full, account a request-queue drop, retain
the TIME_WAIT socket, and discard the SYN. Once the queue has room,
the existing direct-reopen path and its TIME_WAIT ISN are unchanged.
Normal SYNs continue to use syncookies when the listener is full.
I do not see it as a threat, sorry.
Say no to AI hallucinations.