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Simon says:

Hi Haoxiang,

I think that the pre-existing issues flagged below do not need
to be considered in the context of this patch. But I am wondering
if you could take a look over the others.

---
net: meth: Fix skb allocation failure handling in RX init

meth_init_rx_ring() does not check the return value of alloc_skb().
If the allocation fails, the NULL skb is passed to skb_reserve() and
then dereferenced through skb->head.

[ ... ]

[Severity: Critical]
During the allocation loop, each successfully mapped DMA address is pushed
immediately to the hardware via the mace->eth.rx_fifo register. Unmapping
them here frees the memory, but the hardware FIFO still retains the physical
addresses.

When meth_init_rx_ring() returns -ENOMEM to meth_tx_timeout(), the error is
ignored and the RX DMA engine is enabled anyway:

meth_tx_timeout()
    ...
    meth_init_rx_ring(priv);
    priv->dma_ctrl |= METH_DMA_TX_EN | METH_DMA_RX_EN | METH_DMA_RX_INT_EN;

Will this cause the hardware to DMA incoming packet data into the unmapped
and potentially reallocated memory?

+		priv->rx_ring[i] = 0;

[Severity: High]
If the hardware remains active as described above, will the RX interrupt
handler dereference this NULL pointer?

When the hardware receives a packet, it raises an RX interrupt and meth_rx()
attempts to process it:

meth_rx()
    ...
    status = priv->rx_ring[priv->rx_write]->status.raw;

Since the pointer at this index was cleared in the error path, this looks
like it will cause a kernel panic.

+		priv->rx_ring_dmas[i] = 0;
+		kfree_skb(priv->rx_skbs[i]);
+		priv->rx_skbs[i] = NULL;

[Severity: Critical]
Does this partial cleanup lead to a double free of socket buffers?

When meth_init_rx_ring() fails at index N, this loop zeroes out elements 0
through N-1. The elements from N through 63 retain their dangling pointers
from the previous execution of meth_free_rx_ring(), which fails to clear SKB
pointers after freeing them.

Since meth_tx_timeout() ignores the error and leaves the device running, the
next time meth_free_rx_ring() is called, it iterates over all 64 elements
again. Will this call kfree_skb() on the dangling pointers in indices N
through 63?

+	}
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but dma_map_single() is called in
meth_init_rx_ring() without checking for mapping errors:

meth_init_rx_ring()
    ...
    priv->rx_ring_dmas[i] = dma_map_single(&priv->pdev->dev,
                                           priv->rx_ring[i],
                                           METH_RX_BUFF_SIZE,
                                           DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
    mace->eth.rx_fifo = priv->rx_ring_dmas[i];

If the mapping fails, an error cookie is passed directly to the hardware.
Could this lead to IOMMU faults or memory corruption when DMA bounce buffers
are exhausted?

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but there appears to be a race condition due
to lockless processing in meth_rx().

The interrupt handler drops the spinlock before processing the ring:

meth_rx()
    ...
    spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->meth_lock, flags);
    ...
    while (priv->rx_write != fifo_rptr) {

Concurrently, meth_tx_timeout() can acquire the lock and destroy the RX rings,
falsely assuming it is protected:

meth_tx_timeout()
    ...
    spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->meth_lock,flags);
    meth_reset(dev);
    ...
    meth_free_rx_ring(priv);

If meth_free_rx_ring() frees the SKBs while meth_rx() is still executing the
lockless while loop, could this result in a use-after-free or NULL pointer
dereference?