On 2/25/26 5:25 PM, Chuck Lever wrote:

From: Chuck Lever <redacted>

Profiling NFSD under an iozone workload showed that hardened
usercopy checks consume roughly 1.3% of CPU in the TCP receive path.
These checks validate memory regions during copies, but provide no
security benefit when both source (skb data) and destination (kernel
pages in BVEC/KVEC iterators) reside in kernel address space.

Are you sure? AFAICS:

size_t copy_from_iter(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)
{
        if (check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false))
                return _copy_from_iter(addr, bytes, i);

calls check_copy_size() on the source address, and the latter:

static __always_inline __must_check bool
check_copy_size(const void *addr, size_t bytes, bool is_source)
{
        int sz = __builtin_object_size(addr, 0);
        if (unlikely(sz >= 0 && sz < bytes)) {
        if (!__builtin_constant_p(bytes))
                        copy_overflow(sz, bytes);
                else if (is_source)$
                        __bad_copy_from();
                else
                        __bad_copy_to();
                return false;
        }
        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bytes > INT_MAX))
                return false;

Validates vs overflow regardless of the source address being in kernel
space or user-space.

FTR, I also observe a relevant overhead in check_copy_size(), especially
for oldish CPUs.

/P