On 2026/01/22 20:32, Steffen Klassert wrote:

On Thu, Jan 22, 2026 at 08:28:31PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:

quoted

On 2026/01/22 20:15, Steffen Klassert wrote:

quoted

Hm, I'd say we should not try to offload to a device that does
not support NETIF_F_HW_ESP.

I was about to post the patch below, but you are suggesting that "do not allow calling
xfrm_dev_state_add()/xfrm_dev_policy_add() if (dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_ESP) == 0" ?

As said, I think this is the correct way to do it. But let's wait
on opinions from the hardware people.

OK. I guess something like below.

 net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
index 52ae0e034d29..19aa61609d24 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c

@@ -292,6 +292,13 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net, struct xfrm_state *x,
 		dst_release(dst);
 	}
 
+	if (!(dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_ESP)) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Device doesn't support offload");
+		xso->dev = NULL;
+		dev_put(dev);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (!dev->xfrmdev_ops || !dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_add) {
 		xso->dev = NULL;
 		dev_put(dev);

@@ -367,7 +374,8 @@ int xfrm_dev_policy_add(struct net *net, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 	if (!dev)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!dev->xfrmdev_ops || !dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_policy_add) {
+	if (!dev->xfrmdev_ops || !dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_policy_add ||
+	    !(dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_ESP)) {
 		xdo->dev = NULL;
 		dev_put(dev);
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Policy offload is not supported");

On 2026/01/22 20:15, Steffen Klassert wrote:

quoted

But I have a question regarding security_xfrm_state_delete()/security_xfrm_policy_delete().

xfrm_dev_state_flush_secctx_check() calls security_xfrm_state_delete() which can make
xfrm_dev_state_flush() no-op by returning an error value.
xfrm_dev_policy_flush_secctx_check() calls security_xfrm_policy_delete() which can make
xfrm_dev_policy_flush() no-op by returning an error value.

Since xfrm_dev_state_flush()/xfrm_dev_policy_flush() are called by NETDEV_UNREGISTER
event (which is a signal for releasing all resources that prevent "struct net_device"
references from dropping), making xfrm_dev_state_flush()/xfrm_dev_policy_flush() no-op (by
allowing security_xfrm_state_delete()/security_xfrm_policy_delete() to return an error) is
a denial-of-service bug.

This means that the calling task doesn't have the permission to delete the
state, some LSM has a policy the does not grant this permission.

But NETDEV_UNREGISTER event can fire without explicit request from a user.
Roughly speaking, current behavior is that

  while (security_xfrm_state_delete() != 0) {
    schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(10 * HZ);
    pr_emerg("unregister_netdevice: waiting for %s to become free. Usage count = %d\n",
             dev->name, netdev_refcnt_read(dev));
  }
  while (security_xfrm_policy_delete() != 0) {
    schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(10 * HZ);
    pr_emerg("unregister_netdevice: waiting for %s to become free. Usage count = %d\n",
             dev->name, netdev_refcnt_read(dev));
  }

might be executed upon e.g. termination of a userspace process.

quoted

Therefore, I wonder what are security_xfrm_state_delete() and security_xfrm_policy_delete()
for. Can I kill xfrm_dev_state_flush_secctx_check() and xfrm_dev_policy_flush_secctx_check() ?

This might violate a LSM policy then.

But LSM policy that results in system hung upon automatic cleanup logic is so stupid.
I want to kill xfrm_dev_state_flush_secctx_check() and xfrm_dev_policy_flush_secctx_check()
in order to eliminate possibility of system hung.