On Wed, 2025-09-24 at 19:50 +0200, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:

[...]

quoted

+
 static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,
sockptr_t optval,
 			     unsigned int optlen)
 {

@@ -833,6 +898,9 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk,

int optname, sockptr_t optval,
 	case TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD:
 		rc = do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad(sk, optval, optlen);
 		break;
+	case TLS_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM:
+		rc = do_tls_setsockopt_tx_record_size(sk, optval,
optlen);

I think we want to lock the socket here, to avoid any concurrent
send()?
Especially now with the ->open_rec check.

Yeah that's a good point, will fixup!

quoted

@@ -1111,6 +1180,11 @@ static int tls_get_info(struct sock *sk,

struct sk_buff *skb, bool net_admin)
 			goto nla_failure;
 	}
 
+	err = nla_put_u16(skb, TLS_INFO_TX_RECORD_SIZE_LIM,
+			  ctx->tx_record_size_limit);

I'm not sure here: if we do the +1 adjustment we'd be consistent with
the value reported by getsockopt, but OTOH users may get confused
about seeing a value larger than TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE.

Makes sense to keep the behaviour the same as getsockopt() right? So
add the +1 changes here based on version (same as getsockopt()). In
which case, it should never exceed TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE.

Regards,
Wilfred