Re: [PATCH net] net: check the minimum value of gso size in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: 2025-07-27 16:36:39
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Wang Liang wrote:
在 2025/7/24 21:29, Willem de Bruijn 写道:quoted
Wang Liang wrote:quoted
When sending a packet with virtio_net_hdr to tun device, if the gso_type in virtio_net_hdr is SKB_GSO_UDP and the gso_size is less than udphdr size, below crash may happen.gso_size is the size of the segment payload, excluding the transport header. This is probably not the right approach. Not sure how a GSO skb can be built that is shorter than even the transport header. Maybe an skb_dump of the GSO skb can be elucidating.quoted
return -EINVAL; /* Too small packets are not really GSO ones. */ -- 2.34.1Thanks for your review!
Thanks for the dump and repro. I can indeed reproduce, only with the UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP setsockopt.
Here is the skb_dump result: skb len=4 headroom=98 headlen=4 tailroom=282 mac=(64,14) mac_len=14 net=(78,20) trans=98 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0x8c start=140 offset=0 ip_summed=1 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0)
So this is as expected not the original GSO skb, but a segment,
after udp_rcv_segment from udp_queue_rcv_skb.
It is a packet with skb->data pointing to the transport header, and
only 4B length. So this is an illegal UDP packet with length shorter
than sizeof(struct udphdr).
The packet does not enter xfrm4_gro_udp_encap_rcv, so we can exclude
that.
It does enter __xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv, which will return 1 because the
pskb_may_pull will fail. There is a negative integer overflow just
before that:
len = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr) + min(len, 8)))
return 1;
This is true for all the segments btw, not just the last one. On
return of 1 here, the packet does not enter encap_rcv but gets
passed to the socket as a normal UDP packet:
/* If it's a keepalive packet, then just eat it.
* If it's an encapsulated packet, then pass it to the
* IPsec xfrm input.
* Returns 0 if skb passed to xfrm or was dropped.
* Returns >0 if skb should be passed to UDP.
* Returns <0 if skb should be resubmitted (-ret is protocol)
*/
int xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
But so the real bug, an skb with 4B in the UDP layer happens before
that.
An skb_dump in udp_queue_rcv_skb of the GSO skb shows
[ 174.151409] skb len=190 headroom=64 headlen=190 tailroom=66
[ 174.151409] mac=(64,14) mac_len=14 net=(78,20) trans=98
[ 174.151409] shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=4 type=65538 segs=0))
[ 174.151409] csum(0x8c start=140 offset=0 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0)
[ 174.151409] hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0800 pkttype=2 iif=8
[ 174.151409] priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=1 vlan_all=0x0
[ 174.151409] encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0)
[ 174.152101] dev name=tun0 feat=0x00002000000048c1
And of segs[0] after segmentation
[ 103.081442] skb len=38 headroom=64 headlen=38 tailroom=218
[ 103.081442] mac=(64,14) mac_len=14 net=(78,20) trans=98
[ 103.081442] shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
[ 103.081442] csum(0x8c start=140 offset=0 ip_summed=1 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0)
[ 103.081442] hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0800 pkttype=2 iif=8
[ 103.081442] priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=0 vlan_all=0x0
[ 103.081442] encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0)
So here translen is already 38 - (98-64) == 38 - 34 == 4.
So the bug happens in segmentation.
[ongoing ..]