Thread (5 messages) 5 messages, 2 authors, 2025-02-03

Re: [PATCH net] tun: revert fix group permission check

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: 2025-02-03 22:54:28

stsp wrote:
03.02.2025 22:09, Willem de Bruijn пишет:
quoted
stsp wrote:
quoted
03.02.2025 18:05, Willem de Bruijn пишет:
quoted
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

This reverts commit 3ca459eaba1bf96a8c7878de84fa8872259a01e3.

The blamed commit caused a regression when neither tun->owner nor
tun->group is set. This is intended to be allowed, but now requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Discussion in the referenced thread pointed out that the original
issue that prompted this patch can be resolved in userspace.
The point of the patch was
not to fix userspace, but this
bug: when you have owner set,
then adding group either changes
nothing at all, or removes all
access. I.e. there is no valid case
for adding group when owner
already set.
As long as no existing users are affected, no need to relax this after
all these years.
I only mean the wording.
My patch initially says what
exactly does it fix, so the fact
that the problem can be fixed
in user-space, was likely obvious
from the very beginning.
quoted
quoted
During the discussion it became
obvious that simpler fixes may
exist (like eg either-or semantic),
so why not to revert based on
that?
We did not define either-or in detail. Do you mean failing the
TUNSETOWNER or TUNSETGROUP ioctl if the other is already set?
I mean, auto-removing group when
the owner is being set, for example.
Its not a functionality change: the
behaviour is essentially as before,
except no such case when no one
can access the device.
quoted
quoted
quoted
The relaxed access control may now make a device accessible when it
previously wasn't, while existing users may depend on it to not be.

Since the fix is not critical and introduces security risk, revert,
Well, I don't agree with that justification.
My patch introduced the usability
problem, but not a security risk.
I don't want to be attributed with
the security risk when this wasn't
the case (to the very least, you
still need the perms to open /dev/net/tun),
so could you please remove that part?
I don't think you need to exaggerate
anything: it introduces the usability
regression, which should be enough
for any instant revert.
This is not intended to cast blame, of course.

That said, I can adjust the wording.
Would be good.
Will do.
 
quoted
The access control that we relaxed is when a process is not allowed
to access a device until the administrator adds it to the right group.
No-no, adding doesn't help.
The process have to die and
re-login. Besides, not only the
"process" can't access the device,
no. Everyone can't. And by the
mere fact of adding a group...
A device can be created with owner/group constraints before the
intended process (and session) exists.
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help