Re: [PATCH] selinux: Read sk->sk_family once in selinux_socket_bind()
From: Mikhail Ivanov <hidden>
Date: 2025-01-09 16:28:59
Also in:
linux-security-module, selinux
On 1/8/2025 12:00 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 3:16 PM Stephen Smalley [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Fri, Dec 13, 2024 at 3:09 PM Paul Moore [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Fri, Dec 13, 2024 at 11:40 AM Mikhail Ivanov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 12/13/2024 6:46 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:quoted
On Fri, Dec 13, 2024 at 5:57 AM Mikhail Ivanov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 12/12/2024 8:50 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:quoted
This looks good be there are other places using sk->sk_family that should also be fixed.Thanks for checking this! For selinux this should be enough, I haven't found any other places where sk->sk_family could be read from an IPv6 socket without locking. I also would like to prepare such fix for other LSMs (apparmor, smack, tomoyo) (in separate patches).I'm wondering about the implications for SELinux beyond just sk->sk_family access, e.g. SELinux maps the (family, type, protocol) triple to a security class at socket creation time via socket_type_to_security_class() and caches the security class in the inode_security_struct and sk_security_struct for later use.IPv6 and IPv4 TCP sockets are mapped to the same SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET security class. AFAICS there is no other places that can be affected by the IPV6_ADDFORM transformation.Yes, thankfully we don't really encode the IP address family in any of the SELinux object classes so that shouldn't be an issue. I also don't think we have to worry about the per-packet labeling protocols as it's too late in the communication to change the socket's associated packet labeling, it's either working or it isn't; we should handle the mapped IPv4 address already. I am a little concerned about bind being the only place where we have to worry about accessing sk_family while the socket isn't locked. As an example, I'm a little concerned about the netfilter code paths; I haven't chased them down, but my guess is that the associated socket/sock isn't locked in those cases (in the relevant output and postroute cases, forward should be a non-issue).We still need an answer on this.
Sorry for the late reply, I found out that security_sock_rcv_skb() can also be called without locking the IPv6 socket (this can be easily verified by manual testing). Netfilter hooks seems to be ok, family value is taken from the nf_hook_state structure, so there is no access to sk->sk_family. SCTP and MPTCP hooks should not be considered, because IPV6_ADDRFORM is only available for TCP, UDP and UDPLITE protocols. There are 2 more functions that access sk_family: * security_sock_graft() - socket is locked by inet_accept(), * security_inet_conn_established() - socket is locked by connect(2) or in BH context (Cf. tcp_v6_rcv).
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How bad is the performance impact of READ_ONCE()? In other words, how stupid would it be to simply do all of our sock->sk_family lookups using READ_ONCE()?I could be wrong, but I don't think there is any overhead except on Dec Alpha.Then perhaps the right answer is to use it everywhere.
Indeed, using READ_ONCE() in the considered hooks should not lead to any overhead. I wonder if it would be better not to touch the SCTP and MPTCP hooks anyway. Adding READ_ONCE() in selinux_sock_graft() is fine if you think it's better this way.