[PATCH v2 4/4] Landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL
From: Tahera Fahimi <hidden>
Date: 2024-08-06 18:11:22
Also in:
linux-security-module, lkml
Subsystem:
documentation, landlock security module, the rest · Maintainers:
Jonathan Corbet, Mickaël Salaün, Linus Torvalds
Improving Landlock ABI version 6 to support signal scoping with LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL. Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <redacted> --- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 27 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 01bd62dc6bb1..1923abfd2007 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control ===================================== :Author: Mickaël Salaün -:Date: July 2024 +:Date: August 2024 The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, .scoped = - LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET, + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL, }; Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -123,7 +124,8 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights: ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV; case 5: /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET for ABI < 6 */ - ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET; + ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | + LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL); } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -319,11 +321,14 @@ interactions between sandboxes. Each Landlock domain can be explicitly scoped for a set of actions by specifying it on a ruleset. For example, if a sandboxed process should not be able to :manpage:`connect(2)` to a non-sandboxed process through abstract :manpage:`unix(7)` sockets, we can specify such restriction -with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``. +with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``. Moreover, if a sandboxed process +should not be able to send a signal to a non-sandboxed process, we can specify +this restriction with ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL``. -A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process when its domain is -not scoped. If a process's domain is scoped, it can only connect to processes in -the same scoped domain. +A sandboxed process can access to a non-sandboxed process when its domain is +not scoped. If a process's domain is scoped, it can only access to processes in +the same scoped domain. For example, If a process is scoped to send signal to +other processes, it can only send signals to processes in the same scoped domain. IPC scoping does not support Landlock rules, so if a domain is scoped, no rules can be added to allow accessing to a resource outside of the scoped domain.
@@ -563,12 +568,12 @@ earlier ABI. Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of :manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right. -Abstract Unix sockets Restriction (ABI < 6) --------------------------------------------- +Abstract Unix sockets and Signal Restriction (ABI < 6) +------------------------------------------------------- With ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict connection to an abstract Unix socket -through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``, thanks to the ``scoped`` ruleset -attribute. +through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET`` and sending signal through +``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL``, thanks to the ``scoped`` ruleset attribute. .. _kernel_support:
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2.34.1