Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] ubsan: Reintroduce signed and unsigned overflow sanitizers
From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Date: 2024-02-02 13:45:05
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linux-acpi, linux-crypto, linux-doc, linux-hardening, linux-kbuild, lkml, llvm
On Fri, 2 Feb 2024 at 13:17, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:
On Fri, Feb 02, 2024 at 12:01:55PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:quoted
On Fri, 2 Feb 2024 at 11:16, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
[...] +config UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP + bool "Perform checking for unsigned arithmetic wrap-around" + depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow) + depends on !X86_32 # avoid excessive stack usage on x86-32/clang + depends on !COMPILE_TEST + help + This option enables -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow which checks + for wrap-around of any arithmetic operations with unsigned integers. This + currently causes x86 to fail to boot.My hypothesis is that these options will quickly be enabled by various test and fuzzing setups, to the detriment of kernel developers. While the commit message states that these are for experimentation, I do not think it is at all clear from the Kconfig options.I can certainly rephrase it more strongly. I would hope that anyone enabling the unsigned sanitizer would quickly realize how extremely noisy it is.quoted
Unsigned integer wrap-around is relatively common (it is _not_ UB after all). While I can appreciate that in some cases wrap around is a genuine semantic bug, and that's what we want to find with these changes, ultimately marking all semantically valid wrap arounds to catch the unmarked ones. Given these patterns are so common, and C programmers are used to them, it will take a lot of effort to mark all the intentional cases. But I fear that even if we get to that place, _unmarked_ but semantically valid unsigned wrap around will keep popping up again and again.I agree -- it's going to be quite a challenge. My short-term goal is to see how far the sanitizer itself can get with identifying intentional uses. For example, I found two more extremely common code patterns that trip it now: unsigned int i = ...; ... while (i--) { ... } This trips the sanitizer at loop exit. :P It seems like churn to refactor all of these into "for (; i; i--)". The compiler should be able to identify this by looking for later uses of "i", etc. The other is negative constants: -1UL, -3ULL, etc. These are all over the place and very very obviously intentional and should be ignored by the compiler.
Yeah, banning technically valid code like this is going to be a very hard sell.
quoted
What is the long-term vision to minimize the additional churn this may introduce?My hope is that we can evolve the coverage over time. Solving it all at once won't be possible, but I think we can get pretty far with the signed overflow sanitizer, which runs relatively cleanly already. If we can't make meaningful progress in unsigned annotations, I think we'll have to work on gaining type-based operator overloading so we can grow type-aware arithmetic. That will serve as a much cleaner annotation. E.g. introduce jiffie_t, which wraps.quoted
I think the problem reminds me a little of the data race problem, although I suspect unsigned integer wraparound is much more common than data races (which unlike unsigned wrap around is actually UB) - so chasing all intentional unsigned integer wrap arounds and marking will take even more effort than marking all intentional data races (which we're still slowly, but steadily, making progress towards). At the very least, these options should 'depends on EXPERT' or even 'depends on BROKEN' while the story is still being worked out.Perhaps I should hold off on bringing the unsigned sanitizer back? I was hoping to work in parallel with the signed sanitizer, but maybe this isn't the right approach?
I leave that to you - to me any of these options would be ok: 1. Remove completely for now. 2. Make it 'depends on BROKEN' (because I think even 'depends on EXPERT' won't help avoid the inevitable spam from test robots). 3. Make it a purely opt-in sanitizer: rather than having subsystems opt out with UBSAN_WRAP_UNSIGNED:=n, do the opposite and say that for subsystems that want to opt in, they have to specify UBSAN_WRAP_UNSIGNED:=y to explicitly opt in. I can see there being value in explicitly marking semantically intended unsigned integer wrap, and catch unintended cases, so option #3 seems appealing. At least that way, if a maintainer chooses to opt in, they are committed to sorting out their code. Hypothetically, if I was the maintainer of some smaller subsystem and have had wrap around bugs in the past, I would certainly consider opting in. It feels a lot nicer than having it forced upon me. Thanks, -- Marco