Thread (11 messages) 11 messages, 3 authors, 2024-02-02

Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] ubsan: Reintroduce signed and unsigned overflow sanitizers

From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Date: 2024-02-02 13:45:05
Also in: linux-acpi, linux-crypto, linux-doc, linux-hardening, linux-kbuild, lkml, llvm

On Fri, 2 Feb 2024 at 13:17, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:
On Fri, Feb 02, 2024 at 12:01:55PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
quoted
On Fri, 2 Feb 2024 at 11:16, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
[...]
+config UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP
+       bool "Perform checking for unsigned arithmetic wrap-around"
+       depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow)
+       depends on !X86_32 # avoid excessive stack usage on x86-32/clang
+       depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+       help
+         This option enables -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow which checks
+         for wrap-around of any arithmetic operations with unsigned integers. This
+         currently causes x86 to fail to boot.
My hypothesis is that these options will quickly be enabled by various
test and fuzzing setups, to the detriment of kernel developers. While
the commit message states that these are for experimentation, I do not
think it is at all clear from the Kconfig options.
I can certainly rephrase it more strongly. I would hope that anyone
enabling the unsigned sanitizer would quickly realize how extremely
noisy it is.
quoted
Unsigned integer wrap-around is relatively common (it is _not_ UB
after all). While I can appreciate that in some cases wrap around is a
genuine semantic bug, and that's what we want to find with these
changes, ultimately marking all semantically valid wrap arounds to
catch the unmarked ones. Given these patterns are so common, and C
programmers are used to them, it will take a lot of effort to mark all
the intentional cases. But I fear that even if we get to that place,
_unmarked_  but semantically valid unsigned wrap around will keep
popping up again and again.
I agree -- it's going to be quite a challenge. My short-term goal is to
see how far the sanitizer itself can get with identifying intentional
uses. For example, I found two more extremely common code patterns that
trip it now:

        unsigned int i = ...;
        ...
        while (i--) { ... }

This trips the sanitizer at loop exit. :P It seems like churn to
refactor all of these into "for (; i; i--)". The compiler should be able
to identify this by looking for later uses of "i", etc.

The other is negative constants: -1UL, -3ULL, etc. These are all over
the place and very very obviously intentional and should be ignored by
the compiler.
Yeah, banning technically valid code like this is going to be a very hard sell.
quoted
What is the long-term vision to minimize the additional churn this may
introduce?
My hope is that we can evolve the coverage over time. Solving it all at
once won't be possible, but I think we can get pretty far with the
signed overflow sanitizer, which runs relatively cleanly already.

If we can't make meaningful progress in unsigned annotations, I think
we'll have to work on gaining type-based operator overloading so we can
grow type-aware arithmetic. That will serve as a much cleaner
annotation. E.g. introduce jiffie_t, which wraps.
quoted
I think the problem reminds me a little of the data race problem,
although I suspect unsigned integer wraparound is much more common
than data races (which unlike unsigned wrap around is actually UB) -
so chasing all intentional unsigned integer wrap arounds and marking
will take even more effort than marking all intentional data races
(which we're still slowly, but steadily, making progress towards).

At the very least, these options should 'depends on EXPERT' or even
'depends on BROKEN' while the story is still being worked out.
Perhaps I should hold off on bringing the unsigned sanitizer back? I was
hoping to work in parallel with the signed sanitizer, but maybe this
isn't the right approach?
I leave that to you - to me any of these options would be ok:

1. Remove completely for now.

2. Make it 'depends on BROKEN' (because I think even 'depends on
EXPERT' won't help avoid the inevitable spam from test robots).

3. Make it a purely opt-in sanitizer: rather than having subsystems
opt out with UBSAN_WRAP_UNSIGNED:=n, do the opposite and say that for
subsystems that want to opt in, they have to specify
UBSAN_WRAP_UNSIGNED:=y to explicitly opt in.

I can see there being value in explicitly marking semantically
intended unsigned integer wrap, and catch unintended cases, so option
#3 seems appealing. At least that way, if a maintainer chooses to opt
in, they are committed to sorting out their code. Hypothetically, if I
was the maintainer of some smaller subsystem and have had wrap around
bugs in the past, I would certainly consider opting in. It feels a lot
nicer than having it forced upon me.

Thanks,
-- Marco
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