[PATCH v3 24/55] crypto: af_alg: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: 2023-03-31 16:14:38
Also in:
linux-crypto, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, lkml
Subsystem:
crypto api, the rest · Maintainers:
Herbert Xu, "David S. Miller", Linus Torvalds
Make AF_ALG sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. This causes pages to be
spliced from the source iterator.
This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle
multiple multipage folios in a single transaction.
[!] Note that this makes use of netfs_extract_iter_to_sg() from netfslib.
This probably needs moving to core code somewhere.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
crypto/af_alg.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
crypto/algif_aead.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 8 ++++----
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 9c86f7045157..8c04ecbb4395 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig@@ -1297,6 +1297,7 @@ menu "Userspace interface" config CRYPTO_USER_API tristate + select NETFS_SUPPORT # for netfs_extract_iter_to_sg() config CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH tristate "Hash algorithms"
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index 483821e310e9..3088ab298632 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c@@ -941,6 +941,10 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, bool init = false; int err = 0; + if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) && + !iov_iter_is_bvec(&msg->msg_iter)) + return -EINVAL; + if (msg->msg_controllen) { err = af_alg_cmsg_send(msg, &con); if (err)
@@ -986,7 +990,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, while (size) { struct scatterlist *sg; size_t len = size; - size_t plen; + ssize_t plen; /* use the existing memory in an allocated page */ if (ctx->merge) {
@@ -1031,7 +1035,27 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, if (sgl->cur) sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1); - if (1 /* TODO check MSG_SPLICE_PAGES */) { + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) { + struct sg_table sgtable = { + .sgl = sg, + .nents = sgl->cur, + .orig_nents = sgl->cur, + }; + + plen = netfs_extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, len, + &sgtable, MAX_SGL_ENTS, 0); + if (plen < 0) { + err = plen; + goto unlock; + } + + for (; sgl->cur < sgtable.nents; sgl->cur++) + get_page(sg_page(&sg[sgl->cur])); + len -= plen; + ctx->used += plen; + copied += plen; + size -= plen; + } else { do { struct page *pg; unsigned int i = sgl->cur;
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index f6aa3856d8d5..b16111a3025a 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage. Filling up + * the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. *
@@ -113,19 +113,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } /* - * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage that has not - * yet been processed. + * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg that has not yet been + * processed. */ used = ctx->used; /* - * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is - * also present in sendmsg/sendpage. The checks in sendpage/sendmsg - * shall provide an information to the data sender that something is - * wrong, but they are irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. - * We need this check here too in case user space decides to not honor - * the error message in sendmsg/sendpage and still call recvmsg. This - * check here protects the kernel integrity. + * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is also + * present in sendmsg. The checks in sendmsg shall provide an + * information to the data sender that something is wrong, but they are + * irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. We need this check + * here too in case user space decides to not honor the error message + * in sendmsg and still call recvmsg. This check here protects the + * kernel integrity. */ if (!aead_sufficient_data(sk)) return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index a251cd6bd5b9..b1f321b9f846 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be - * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must - * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg. Filling up the TX + * SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be tracked by + * the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must provide a + * buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. * * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is * allocated and prepared. As part of the recvmsg operation, the processed