Re: SO_PEERSEC protections in sk_getsockopt()?
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: 2022-10-07 17:43:30
Also in:
linux-security-module, selinux
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: 2022-10-07 17:43:30
Also in:
linux-security-module, selinux
On Wed, Oct 5, 2022 at 4:44 PM Paul Moore [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi Martin,
In commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") I see you wrapped the getsockopt value/len
pointers with sockptr_t and in the SO_PEERSEC case you pass the
sockptr_t:user field to avoid having to update the LSM hook and
implementations. I think that's fine, especially as you note that
eBPF does not support fetching the SO_PEERSEC information, but I think
it would be good to harden this case to prevent someone from calling
sk_getsockopt(SO_PEERSEC) with kernel pointers. What do you think of
something like this?
static int sk_getsockopt(...)
{
/* ... */
case SO_PEERSEC:
if (optval.is_kernel || optlen.is_kernel)
return -EINVAL;
return security_socket_getpeersec_stream(...);
/* ... */
}Any thoughts on this Martin, Alexei? It would be nice to see this fixed soon ... -- paul-moore.com