Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends

Hello:

This series was applied to netdev/net-next.git (refs/heads/master):

On Tue, 24 Aug 2021 12:28:05 +0200 you wrote:

Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [v2,1/4] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/8446066bf8c1
  - [v2,2/4] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/162081ec33c2
  - [v2,3/4] xen/netfront: disentangle tx_skb_freelist
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/21631d2d741a
  - [v2,4/4] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/a884daa61a7d

You are awesome, thank you!
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