Re: [PATCH net 1/3] netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Date: 2021-06-09 14:51:49
Maxim Mikityanskiy [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). Cc: Young Xiao <redacted> Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <redacted> --- net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c index b100c04a0e43..621eb5ef9727 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ synproxy_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int doff, length--; continue; default: + if (length < 2) + return true;
Would you mind a v2 that also rejects bogus th->doff value when computing the length? Thanks.