Re: Flaw in "random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity"

On 2020-08-07 12:03 a.m., Willy Tarreau wrote:

Just to give a heads up on this, here's what I'm having pending regarding
MSWS:

   struct rnd_state {
         uint64_t x, w;
         uint64_t seed;
         uint64_t noise;
   };

   uint32_t msws32(struct rnd_state *state)
   {
         uint64_t x;

         x  = state->w += state->seed;
         x += state->x * state->x;
         x  = state->x = (x >> 32) | (x << 32);
         x -= state->noise++;
         return x ^ (x >> 32);
   }

A few comments:

This is still another non-cryptographic PRNG. An LFSR can pass PractRand 
(if you do a tweak to get around the specific linear complexity test for 
LFSRs).

On a 64-bit machine it should be fast: 4 adds, 1 multiply, 1 rotate, 1 
shift, 1 xor

This will be much slower on 32-bit machines, if that's still a concern

As long as the noise is the output of a CPRNG, this doesn't hurt the 
security of dev/dandom.

The noise is more like effective 32-bits since you're xoring the low and 
high half of the noise together (ignoring the minor details of carry 
bits). Which means that it's 2^32 effort to brute force this (which Amit 
called "no biggie for modern machines"). If the noise is the raw sample 
data with only a few bits of entropy, then it's even easier to brute force.


Given the uses of this, I think we really should look into a CPRNG for 
this and then completely reseed it periodically. The problem is finding 
one that's fast enough. Is there a hard instruction budget for this, or 
it is just "fast enough to not hurt the network benchmarks" (i.e. if 
Dave Miller screams)?


Marc