Thread (18 messages) flat view 18 messages, 4 authors, 2020-02-06

Re: [bpf PATCH v2 2/8] bpf: sockmap, ensure sock lock held during tear down

From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Date: 2020-02-06 05:51:52
Also in: bpf

Jakub Sitnicki wrote:
On Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 07:12 AM CET, John Fastabend wrote:
quoted
The sock_map_free() and sock_hash_free() paths used to delete sockmap
and sockhash maps walk the maps and destroy psock and bpf state associated
with the socks in the map. When done the socks no longer have BPF programs
attached and will function normally. This can happen while the socks in
the map are still "live" meaning data may be sent/received during the walk.

Currently, though we don't take the sock_lock when the psock and bpf state
is removed through this path. Specifically, this means we can be writing
into the ops structure pointers such as sendmsg, sendpage, recvmsg, etc.
while they are also being called from the networking side. This is not
safe, we never used proper READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE semantics here if we
believed it was safe. Further its not clear to me its even a good idea
to try and do this on "live" sockets while networking side might also
be using the socket. Instead of trying to reason about using the socks
from both sides lets realize that every use case I'm aware of rarely
deletes maps, in fact kubernetes/Cilium case builds map at init and
never tears it down except on errors. So lets do the simple fix and
grab sock lock.

This patch wraps sock deletes from maps in sock lock and adds some
annotations so we catch any other cases easier.

Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Song Liu <redacted>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
---
 net/core/skmsg.c    | 2 ++
 net/core/sock_map.c | 7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
index ded2d5227678..3866d7e20c07 100644
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -594,6 +594,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_psock_destroy);

 void sk_psock_drop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)
 {
+	sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
 	sk_psock_cork_free(psock);
 	sk_psock_zap_ingress(psock);
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index eb114ee419b6..8998e356f423 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -241,8 +241,11 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 		struct sock *sk;

 		sk = xchg(psk, NULL);
-		if (sk)
+		if (sk) {
+			lock_sock(sk);
 			sock_map_unref(sk, psk);
+			release_sock(sk);
+		}
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock_bh(&stab->lock);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
John, I've noticed this is triggering warnings that we might sleep in
lock_sock while (1) in RCU read-side section, and (2) holding a spin
lock:
OK, this patch was misguided, it makes things worse rather than better,
the real fix is to do proper READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE on the sk ops. That
is coming soon. Thanks for following up on it.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.5.0-04012-g38c811e4cd3c #443 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/linux/rcupdate.h:272 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section!

other info that might help us debug this:
[...]
Easy to trigger on a VM with 1 vCPU, reproducer below.
When net-next opens we should add some tests to cover this its not something
I test often because our use case the maps are rarely free'd.
Here's an idea how to change the locking. I'm still wrapping my head
around what protects what in sock_map_free, so please bear with me:

1. synchronize_rcu before we iterate over the array is not needed,
   AFAICT. We are not free'ing the map just yet, hence any readers
   accessing the map via the psock are not in danger of use-after-free.
Agreed. When we added 2bb90e5cc90e ("bpf: sockmap, synchronize_rcu before
free'ing map") we could have done this.
2. rcu_read_lock is needed to protect access to psock inside
   sock_map_unref, but we can't sleep while in RCU read-side.  So push
   it down, after we grab the sock lock.
yes this looks better.
3. Grabbing stab->lock seems not needed, either. We get called from
   bpf_map_free_deferred, after map refcnt dropped to 0, so we're not
   racing with any other map user to modify its contents.
This I'll need to think on a bit. We have the link-lock there so
probably should be safe to drop. But will need to trace this through
git history to be sure.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index 2cbde385e1a0..7f54e0d27d32 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -259,9 +259,6 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
        struct bpf_stab *stab = container_of(map, struct bpf_stab, map);
        int i;

-       synchronize_rcu();
-       rcu_read_lock();
-       raw_spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock);
        for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++) {
                struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i];
                struct sock *sk;
@@ -269,12 +266,12 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
                sk = xchg(psk, NULL);
                if (sk) {
                        lock_sock(sk);
+                       rcu_read_lock();
                        sock_map_unref(sk, psk);
+                       rcu_read_unlock();
                        release_sock(sk);
                }
        }
-       raw_spin_unlock_bh(&stab->lock);
-       rcu_read_unlock();

        synchronize_rcu();
quoted
@@ -862,7 +865,9 @@ static void sock_hash_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 		raw_spin_lock_bh(&bucket->lock);
 		hlist_for_each_entry_safe(elem, node, &bucket->head, node) {
 			hlist_del_rcu(&elem->node);
+			lock_sock(elem->sk);
 			sock_map_unref(elem->sk, elem);
+			release_sock(elem->sk);
 		}
 		raw_spin_unlock_bh(&bucket->lock);
 	}
Similar problems here. With one extra that it seems we're missing a
synchronize_rcu *after* walking over the htable for the same reason as
it got added to sock_map_free in 2bb90e5cc90e ("bpf: sockmap,
synchronize_rcu before free'ing map"):

    We need to have a synchronize_rcu before free'ing the sockmap because
    any outstanding psock references will have a pointer to the map and
    when they use this could trigger a use after free.

WDYT?
Can you push the fix to bpf but leave the stab->lock for now. I think
we can do a slightly better cleanup on stab->lock in bpf-next.
Reproducer follows.
push reproducer into selftests?

Thanks.
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