Thread (8 messages) flat view 8 messages, 2 authors, 2020-02-10
STALE2385d LANDED

Landed in mainline as 499c405b2b80 on 2020-02-10.

[PATCH 1/6] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole

From: Larry Finger <hidden>
Date: 2020-02-10 18:02:53
Also in: stable
Subsystem: staging subsystem, the rest · Maintainers: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Linus Torvalds

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva [off-list ref]
Cc: Pietro Oliva <redacted>
Cc: Stable <redacted>
Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <redacted>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index 9b6ea86d1dcf..7d21f5799640 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!p->pointer) {
+	if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.25.0
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