On Mon, Dec 23, 2019 at 09:40:11AM -0800, Alistair Delva wrote:
Hi Michael,
On Mon, Dec 23, 2019 at 6:09 AM Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The only way for guest to control offloads (as enabled by
VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS) is by sending commands
through CTRL_VQ. So it does not make sense to
acknowledge VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS without
VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ.
The spec does not outlaw devices with such a configuration,
but Linux assumed that with VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS
control vq is always there, resulting in the following crash
when configuring LRO:
kernel BUG at drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1591!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 483 Comm: Binder:330_1 Not tainted 5.4.5-01326-g19463e9acaac #1
Hardware name: ChromiumOS crosvm, BIOS 0
RIP: 0010:virtnet_send_command+0x15d/0x170 [virtio_net]
Code: d8 00 00 00 80 78 02 00 0f 94 c0 65 48 8b 0c 25 28 00 00 00 48 3b 4c 24 70 75 11 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d
+c3 <0f> 0b e8 ec a4 12 c8 66 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffb97940e7bb50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffffffc0596020 RBX: ffffa0e1fc8ea840 RCX: 0000000000000017
RDX: ffffffffc0596110 RSI: 0000000000000011 RDI: 000000000000000d
RBP: ffffb97940e7bbf8 R08: ffffa0e1fc8ea0b0 R09: ffffa0e1fc8ea0b0
R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: ffffffffc0590940 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: ffffa0e1ffad2c00 R14: ffffb97940e7bc08 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0e1fd100000(006b) knlGS:00000000e5ef7494
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000e5eeb82c CR3: 0000000079b06001 CR4: 0000000000360ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? preempt_count_add+0x58/0xb0
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1a/0x40
? __wake_up+0x70/0x190
virtnet_set_features+0x90/0xf0 [virtio_net]
__netdev_update_features+0x271/0x980
? nlmsg_notify+0x5b/0xa0
dev_disable_lro+0x2b/0x190
? inet_netconf_notify_devconf+0xe2/0x120
devinet_sysctl_forward+0x176/0x1e0
proc_sys_call_handler+0x1f0/0x250
proc_sys_write+0xf/0x20
__vfs_write+0x3e/0x190
? __sb_start_write+0x6d/0xd0
vfs_write+0xd3/0x190
ksys_write+0x68/0xd0
__ia32_sys_write+0x14/0x20
do_fast_syscall_32+0x86/0xe0
entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x7c/0x8e
A similar crash will likely trigger when enabling XDP.
Reported-by: Alistair Delva <redacted>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Fixes: 3f93522ffab2 ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set")
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---
Lightly tested.
Alistair, could you please test and confirm that this resolves the
crash for you?
This patch doesn't work. The reason is that NETIF_F_LRO is also turned
on by TSO4/TSO6, which your patch didn't check for. So it ends up
going through the same path and crashing in the same way.
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) ||
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6))
dev->features |= NETIF_F_LRO;
It sounds like this patch is fixing something slightly differently to
my patch fixed. virtnet_set_features() doesn't care about
GUEST_OFFLOADS, it only tests against NETIF_F_LRO. Even if "offloads"
is zero, it will call virtnet_set_guest_offloads(), which triggers the
crash.
Oh wait a second. You mean when we try to clear the offloads, right?
So either we need to ensure NETIF_F_LRO is never set, or
virtnet_set_features needs to be updated to check for GUEST_OFFLOADS,
right?
So we have:
static int virtnet_set_features(struct net_device *dev,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
u64 offloads;
int err;
if ((dev->features ^ features) & NETIF_F_LRO) {
if (vi->xdp_queue_pairs)
return -EBUSY;
if (features & NETIF_F_LRO)
offloads = vi->guest_offloads_capable;
else
offloads = 0;
err = virtnet_set_guest_offloads(vi, offloads);
if (err)
return err;
vi->guest_offloads = offloads;
}
return 0;
}
and
static int virtnet_set_guest_offloads(struct virtnet_info *vi, u64 offloads)
{
struct scatterlist sg;
vi->ctrl->offloads = cpu_to_virtio64(vi->vdev, offloads);
sg_init_one(&sg, &vi->ctrl->offloads, sizeof(vi->ctrl->offloads));
if (!virtnet_send_command(vi, VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS,
VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS_SET, &sg)) {
dev_warn(&vi->dev->dev, "Fail to set guest offload.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
finally
static bool virtnet_send_command(struct virtnet_info *vi, u8 class, u8 cmd,
struct scatterlist *out)
{
struct scatterlist *sgs[4], hdr, stat;
unsigned out_num = 0, tmp;
/* Caller should know better */
BUG_ON(!virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ));
vi->ctrl->status = ~0;
...
}
so return false here and we should be good right?
quoted
Dave, after testing confirms the fix, pls queue up for stable.
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
index 4d7d5434cc5d..7b8805b47f0d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
@@ -2971,6 +2971,15 @@ static int virtnet_validate(struct virtio_device *vdev)
if (!virtnet_validate_features(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
+ /* VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS does not work without
+ * VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ. However the virtio spec does not
+ * specify that VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS depends
+ * on VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ so devices can set the later but
+ * not the former.
+ */
+ if (!virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ))
+ __virtio_clear_bit(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS);
+
if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MTU)) {
int mtu = virtio_cread16(vdev,
offsetof(struct virtio_net_config,
--MST