On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 09:29:13PM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:

On Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:24:47 -0500
Joel Fernandes [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:27:05AM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:

quoted

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 09:43:14AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:

quoted

Then we should still probably fix up "__probe_kernel_read()" to not
allow user accesses. The easiest way to do that is actually likely to
use the "unsafe_get_user()" functions *without* doing a
uaccess_begin(), which will mean that modern CPU's will simply fault
on a kernel access to user space.

On bpf side the bpf_probe_read() helper just calls probe_kernel_read()
and users pass both user and kernel addresses into it and expect
that the helper will actually try to read from that address.

Slightly related and FWIW, BCC's eBPF-based opensnoop tool [1] installs a
kprobe on do_sys_open to monitor calls to the open syscall globally.

do_sys_open() has prototype:

long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode);

This causes a "blank" filename to be displayed by opensnoop when I run it on
my Pixel 3 (arm64), possibly because this is a user pointer. However, it
works fine on x86-64.

So it seems to me that on arm64, reading user pointers directly still doesn't
work even if there is a distinction between user/kernel addresses. In that
case reading the user pointer using user accessors (possibly using
bpf_probe_user_read helper) should be needed to fix this issue (as Yonghong
also privately discussed with me).

OK, it sounds like the same issue. Please add a bpf_user_read() and use it
for __user pointer.

CC'd Yonghong who said eariler to me he would add it, but I could add it too
if he wants me to.

thanks,

 - Joel