Re: [PATCH 1/2] vmalloc: New flag for flush before releasing pages
From: Nadav Amit <hidden>
Date: 2018-12-04 22:48:46
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On Dec 4, 2018, at 11:48 AM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote: On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 11:45 AM Nadav Amit [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
quoted
On Dec 4, 2018, at 10:56 AM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote: On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 5:43 PM Nadav Amit [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
quoted
On Nov 27, 2018, at 4:07 PM, Rick Edgecombe [off-list ref] wrote: Since vfree will lazily flush the TLB, but not lazily free the underlying pages, it often leaves stale TLB entries to freed pages that could get re-used. This is undesirable for cases where the memory being freed has special permissions such as executable.So I am trying to finish my patch-set for preventing transient W+X mappings from taking space, by handling kprobes & ftrace that I missed (thanks again for pointing it out). But all of the sudden, I don’t understand why we have the problem that this (your) patch-set deals with at all. We already change the mappings to make the memory writable before freeing the memory, so why can’t we make it non-executable at the same time? Actually, why do we make the module memory, including its data executable before freeing it???All the code you're looking at is IMO a very awkward and possibly incorrect of doing what's actually necessary: putting the direct map the way it wants to be. Can't we shove this entirely mess into vunmap? Have a flag (as part of vmalloc like in Rick's patch or as a flag passed to a vfree variant directly) that makes the vunmap code that frees the underlying pages also reset their permissions? Right now, we muck with set_memory_rw() and set_memory_nx(), which both have very awkward (and inconsistent with each other!) semantics when called on vmalloc memory. And they have their own flushes, which is inefficient. Maybe the right solution is for vunmap to remove the vmap area PTEs, call into a function like set_memory_rw() that resets the direct maps to their default permissions *without* flushing, and then to do a single flush for everything. Or, even better, to cause the change_page_attr code to do the flush and also to flush the vmap area all at once so that very small free operations can flush single pages instead of flushing globally.Thanks for the explanation. I read it just after I realized that indeed the whole purpose of this code is to get cpa_process_alias() update the corresponding direct mapping. This thing (pageattr.c) indeed seems over-engineered and very unintuitive. Right now I have a list of patch-sets that I owe, so I don’t have the time to deal with it. But, I still think that disable_ro_nx() should not call set_memory_x(). IIUC, this breaks W+X of the direct-mapping which correspond with the module memory. Does it ever stop being W+X?? I’ll have another look.Dunno. I did once chase down a bug where some memory got freed while it was still read-only, and the results were hilarious and hard to debug, since the explosion happened long after the buggy code finished.
This piece of code causes me pain and misery.
So, it turns out that the direct map is *not* changed if you just change
the NX-bit. See change_page_attr_set_clr():
/* No alias checking for _NX bit modifications */
checkalias = (pgprot_val(mask_set) | pgprot_val(mask_clr)) != _PAGE_NX;
How many levels of abstraction are broken in the way? What would happen
if somebody tries to change the NX-bit and some other bit in the PTE?
Luckily, I don’t think someone does… at least for now.
So, again, I think the change I proposed makes sense. nios2 does not have
set_memory_x() and it will not be affected.
[ I can add a comment, although I don’t have know if nios2 has an NX bit,
and I don’t find any code that defines PTEs. Actually where is pte_present()
of nios2 being defined? Whatever. ]