Thread (3 messages) flat view 3 messages, 3 authors, 2018-10-18

Re: [PATCH] ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Date: 2018-10-18 05:02:13
Also in: lkml

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <redacted>
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:06:41 +0200
pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index
ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to
function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index
info->pin_config.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <redacted>
Applied.
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