On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 05:28:12PM +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:

On Fri, Oct 5, 2018 at 4:58 PM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
[off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Thu, Oct 04, 2018 at 01:48:03AM -0700, syzbot wrote:

quoted

Hello,

syzbot found the following crash on:

HEAD commit:    4e6d47206c32 tls: Add support for inplace records encryption
git tree:       net-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13834b81400000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e569aa5632ebd436
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c7dd55d7aec49d48e49a
compiler:       gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)

Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.

IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+c7dd55d7aec49d48e49a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

netlink: 'syz-executor1': attribute type 1 has an invalid length.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sctp_id2assoc+0x3a7/0x3e0
net/sctp/socket.c:276
Read of size 8 at addr ffff880195b3eb20 by task syz-executor2/15454

CPU: 1 PID: 15454 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #242
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
 sctp_id2assoc+0x3a7/0x3e0 net/sctp/socket.c:276

I'm not seeing yet how this could happen.
All sockopts here are serialized by sock_lock.
do_peeloff here would create another socket, but the issue was
triggered before that.
The same function that freed this memory, also removes the entry from
idr mapping, so this entry shouldn't be there anymore.

I have only two theories so far:
- an issue with IDR/RCU.
- something else happened that just the call stacks are not revealing.

The "asoc->base.sk != sk" check after idr_find suggests that we don't
actually know what sock it belongs to. And if we don't know then

Right. The check is more because the IDR is global and not per socket
(and we don't want sockets accessing asocs from other sockets), and not
that the asoc may move to another socket in between, but it also
protects from such cases, yes.

locking this sock can't help keeping another sock association alive.
Am I missing something obvious here? Should we take assoc ref while we

Not sure. Maybe I am.  Thanks for looking into this, btw.

are still holding sctp_assocs_id_lock?

Shouldn't be needed.

Solely by the call stacks:
- we tried to establish a new asoc from a sctp_connect() call,
  blocking one.
- it slept waiting for the connect
- (something closed the asoc in between the sleeps, because it freed
  the asoc right when waking up on sctp_wait_for_connect())
- it freed the asoc after sleeping on it on sctp_wait_for_connect [A]
- another thread tried to peeloff that asoc [B]

For [B] to access the asoc in question, it had to take the same sock
lock [A] had taken, and then the idr should not return an asoc in
sctp_i2asoc(). Note that we can't peeloff an asoc twice, thus why
the certainty here.

If [B] actually kicked in before the sleep resumed, that should have
been fine because it took the same sock lock [A] would have to
re-take. In this case an asoc would have been returned by
sctp_id2asoc(), the asoc would have been moved to a new socket, but
all while holding the original socket sock lock.