[PATCH 09/31] netfilter: nf_tables: avoid BUG_ON usage
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Date: 2018-10-09 06:15:44
Also in:
netfilter-devel
Subsystem:
netfilter, networking [general], the rest · Maintainers:
Pablo Neira Ayuso, Florian Westphal, "David S. Miller", Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Linus Torvalds
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> None of these spots really needs to crash the kernel. In one two cases we can jsut report error to userspace, in the other cases we can just use WARN_ON (and leak memory instead). Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 9 ++++++--- net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c | 6 ++++-- net/netfilter/nft_reject.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index 72dbdb1faa3c..f0159eea2978 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c@@ -1021,7 +1021,8 @@ static int nf_tables_deltable(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, static void nf_tables_table_destroy(struct nft_ctx *ctx) { - BUG_ON(ctx->table->use > 0); + if (WARN_ON(ctx->table->use > 0)) + return; rhltable_destroy(&ctx->table->chains_ht); kfree(ctx->table->name);
@@ -1428,7 +1429,8 @@ static void nf_tables_chain_destroy(struct nft_ctx *ctx) { struct nft_chain *chain = ctx->chain; - BUG_ON(chain->use > 0); + if (WARN_ON(chain->use > 0)) + return; /* no concurrent access possible anymore */ nf_tables_chain_free_chain_rules(chain);
@@ -7243,7 +7245,8 @@ int __nft_release_basechain(struct nft_ctx *ctx) { struct nft_rule *rule, *nr; - BUG_ON(!nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain)); + if (WARN_ON(!nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain))) + return 0; nf_tables_unregister_hook(ctx->net, ctx->chain->table, ctx->chain); list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, nr, &ctx->chain->rules, list) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c b/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c
index fa90a8402845..79d48c1d06f4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static int nft_cmp_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, err = nft_data_init(NULL, &priv->data, sizeof(priv->data), &desc, tb[NFTA_CMP_DATA]); - BUG_ON(err < 0); + if (err < 0) + return err; priv->sreg = nft_parse_register(tb[NFTA_CMP_SREG]); err = nft_validate_register_load(priv->sreg, desc.len);
@@ -129,7 +130,8 @@ static int nft_cmp_fast_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, err = nft_data_init(NULL, &data, sizeof(data), &desc, tb[NFTA_CMP_DATA]); - BUG_ON(err < 0); + if (err < 0) + return err; priv->sreg = nft_parse_register(tb[NFTA_CMP_SREG]); err = nft_validate_register_load(priv->sreg, desc.len);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c b/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c
index 29f5bd2377b0..b48e58cceeb7 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_reject.c@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ static u8 icmp_code_v4[NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_MAX + 1] = { int nft_reject_icmp_code(u8 code) { - BUG_ON(code > NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_MAX); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(code > NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_MAX)) + return ICMP_NET_UNREACH; return icmp_code_v4[code]; }
@@ -111,7 +112,8 @@ static u8 icmp_code_v6[NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_MAX + 1] = { int nft_reject_icmpv6_code(u8 code) { - BUG_ON(code > NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_MAX); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(code > NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_MAX)) + return ICMPV6_NOROUTE; return icmp_code_v6[code]; }
--
2.11.0