Re: [PATCH net 4/5] tcp: prevent bogus undos when SACK is not enabled
flat view
From: Ilpo Järvinen <hidden>
Date: 2018-03-09 14:11:50
On Wed, 7 Mar 2018, Yuchung Cheng wrote:
On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Neal Cardwell [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:59 AM, Ilpo Jᅵrvinen [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
A bogus undo may/will trigger when the loss recovery state is kept until snd_una is above high_seq. If tcp_any_retrans_done is zero, retrans_stamp is cleared in this transient state. On the next ACK, tcp_try_undo_recovery again executes and tcp_may_undo will always return true because tcp_packet_delayed has this condition: return !tp->retrans_stamp || ... Check for the false fast retransmit transient condition in tcp_packet_delayed to avoid bogus undos. Since snd_una may have advanced on this ACK but CA state still remains unchanged, prior_snd_una needs to be passed instead of tp->snd_una.This one also seems like a case where it would be nice to have a specific packet-by-packet example, or trace, or packetdrill scenario. Something that we might be able to translate into a test, or at least to document the issue more explicitly.I am hesitate for further logic to make undo "perfect" on non-sack cases b/c undo is very complicated and SACK is extremely well-supported today. so a trace to demonstrate how severe this issue is appreciated.
This is not just some remote corner cases to which I perhaps would understand your "making undo perfect" comment. Those undos result in a burst that, at worst, triggers additional buffer overflow because the correct CC action is cancelled. Unfortunately I don't have now permission to publish the time-seq graph about it but I've tried to improve the changelog messages so that you can better understand under which conditions the problem occurs. SACK case remains the same even after this change. I did rework the logic a bit though (pass prior_snd_una rather than flag around) to make it more obvious but the change is unfortunately lengthy (no matter what I pass through the call-chain). -- i.