Thread (14 messages) 14 messages, 2 authors, 2017-12-13
STALE3148d
Revisions (44)
  1. v1 [diff vs current]
  2. v1 [diff vs current]
  3. v1 [diff vs current]
  4. v1 [diff vs current]
  5. v1 [diff vs current]
  6. v1 [diff vs current]
  7. v1 [diff vs current]
  8. v1 current
  9. v1 [diff vs current]
  10. v1 [diff vs current]
  11. v1 [diff vs current]
  12. v1 [diff vs current]
  13. v1 [diff vs current]
  14. v1 [diff vs current]
  15. v1 [diff vs current]
  16. v1 [diff vs current]
  17. v1 [diff vs current]
  18. v1 [diff vs current]
  19. v1 [diff vs current]
  20. v1 [diff vs current]
  21. v1 [diff vs current]
  22. v1 [diff vs current]
  23. v1 [diff vs current]
  24. v1 [diff vs current]
  25. v1 [diff vs current]
  26. v1 [diff vs current]
  27. v1 [diff vs current]
  28. v2 [diff vs current]
  29. v1 [diff vs current]
  30. v1 [diff vs current]
  31. v1 [diff vs current]
  32. v1 [diff vs current]
  33. v2 [diff vs current]
  34. v1 [diff vs current]
  35. v2 [diff vs current]
  36. v1 [diff vs current]
  37. v2 [diff vs current]
  38. v2 [diff vs current]
  39. v1 [diff vs current]
  40. v1 [diff vs current]
  41. v1 [diff vs current]
  42. v1 [diff vs current]
  43. v2 [diff vs current]
  44. v1 [diff vs current]

[PATCH 09/12] netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checks

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Date: 2017-12-13 18:45:38
Also in: netfilter-devel
Subsystem: netfilter, networking [general], the rest · Maintainers: Pablo Neira Ayuso, Florian Westphal, "David S. Miller", Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Linus Torvalds

From: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>

The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system.  An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:

    vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os

    vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d

These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list.  Add new capable() checks so that they can't.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
 net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
index 36e14b1f061d..a34f314a8c23 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/if.h>
 #include <linux/inetdevice.h>
 #include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 	struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -115,6 +119,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 	struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
 	int err = -ENOENT;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.11.0
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help