Thread (49 messages) flat view 49 messages, 11 authors, 2017-11-30

Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap()

From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Date: 2017-11-28 21:17:05
Also in: linux-security-module, lkml

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:11:34PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 11:14 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
kmod is just a helper to poke userpsace to load a module, that's it.

The old init_module() and newer finit_module() do the real handy work or
module loading, and both currently only use may_init_module():

static int may_init_module(void)
{
        if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) || modules_disabled)
                return -EPERM;

        return 0;
}

This begs the question:

  o If userspace just tries to just use raw finit_module() do we want similar
    checks?

Otherwise, correct me if I'm wrong this all seems pointless.
Hm? That's direct-loading, not auto-loading. This series is only about
auto-loading.
And *all* auto-loading uses aliases? What's the difference between auto-loading
and direct-loading?
We already have a global sysctl for blocking direct-loading (modules_disabled).
My point was that even if you have a CAP_NET_ADMIN check on request_module(),
finit_module() will not check for it, so a crafty userspace could still try
to just finit_module() directly, and completely then bypass the CAP_NET_ADMIN
check.

So unless I'm missing something, I see no point in adding extra checks for
request_module() but nothing for the respective load_module().

  Luis
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