Re: len = bpf_probe_read_str(); bpf_perf_event_output(... len) == FAIL
From: Yonghong Song <hidden>
Date: 2017-11-20 16:47:45
On 11/20/17 5:31 AM, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
Em Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 09:25:17PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann escreveu:quoted
On 11/14/2017 07:15 PM, Yonghong Song wrote:quoted
On 11/14/17 6:19 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:quoted
On 11/14/2017 02:42 PM, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:quoted
Em Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 02:09:34PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann escreveu:quoted
On 11/14/2017 01:58 PM, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:quoted
Em Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 01:09:39AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann escreveu:quoted
On 11/13/2017 04:08 PM, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:quoted
libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG --- libbpf: 0: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +104) 1: (b7) r2 = 0 2: (bf) r6 = r1 3: (bf) r1 = r10 4: (07) r1 += -128 5: (b7) r2 = 128 6: (85) call bpf_probe_read_str#45 7: (bf) r1 = r0 8: (07) r1 += -1 9: (67) r1 <<= 32 10: (77) r1 >>= 32 11: (25) if r1 > 0x7f goto pc+11Right, so the compiler is optimizing the two tests into a single one above, which means lower bound cannot properly be derived again by the verifier due to this and thus you'll get the error. Similar issue was seen recently [1]. Does the below hack work for you? int prog([...]) { char filename[128]; int ret = bpf_probe_read_str(filename, sizeof(filename), filename_ptr); if (ret > 0) bpf_perf_event_output(ctx, &__bpf_stdout__, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, filename, ret & (sizeof(filename) - 1)); return 1; } r0 should keep on tracking bounds here at least: prog: 0: bf 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 r6 = r1 1: bf a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r10 2: 07 01 00 00 80 ff ff ff r1 += -128 3: b7 02 00 00 80 00 00 00 r2 = 128 4: 85 00 00 00 2d 00 00 00 call 45 5: 67 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 <<= 32 6: c7 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 s>>= 32 7: b7 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 r1 = 1 8: 6d 01 0a 00 00 00 00 00 if r1 s> r0 goto 10 9: 57 00 00 00 7f 00 00 00 r0 &= 127 10: bf a4 00 00 00 00 00 00 r4 = r10 11: 07 04 00 00 80 ff ff ff r4 += -128 12: bf 61 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r6 13: 18 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = 0ll 15: 18 03 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = 4294967295ll 17: bf 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 r5 = r0 18: 85 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 call 25 [1] https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patchwork.ozlabs.org_project_netdev_list_-3Fseries-3D13211&d=DwIDaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=Qp3xFfXEz-CT8rzYtrHeXbow2M6FlsUzwcY32i3_2Q0&s=z0d6b_hxStA845Kh7epJ-JiFwkiWqUH_z3fEadwqAQY&e=Not yet: 6: (85) call bpf_probe_read_str#45 7: (bf) r1 = r0 8: (67) r1 <<= 32 9: (77) r1 >>= 32 10: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+10 R0=inv(id=0) R1=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 11: (57) r0 &= 127 12: (bf) r4 = r10 13: (07) r4 += -128 14: (bf) r1 = r6 15: (18) r2 = 0xffff92bfc2aba840u 17: (18) r3 = 0xffffffff 19: (bf) r5 = r0 20: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#25 invalid stack type R4 off=-128 access_size=0 I'll try updating clang/llvm... Full details: [root@jouet bpf]# cat open.c #include "bpf.h" SEC("prog=do_sys_open filename") int prog(void *ctx, int err, const char __user *filename_ptr) { char filename[128]; const unsigned len = bpf_probe_read_str(filename, sizeof(filename), filename_ptr);Btw, I was using 'int' here above instead of 'unsigned' as strncpy_from_unsafe() could potentially return errors like -EFAULT.I changed to int, didn't helpquoted
Currently having a version compiled from the git tree: # llc --version LLVM (https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__llvm.org_&d=DwIDaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=Qp3xFfXEz-CT8rzYtrHeXbow2M6FlsUzwcY32i3_2Q0&s=BKC_Gu9s1hw0v13OCgCpfsGtAY2hE7dujFqg8LNaK2I&e=): LLVM version 6.0.0git-2d810c2 Optimized build. Default target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu Host CPU: skylake[root@jouet bpf]# llc --version LLVM (https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__llvm.org_&d=DwIDaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=Qp3xFfXEz-CT8rzYtrHeXbow2M6FlsUzwcY32i3_2Q0&s=BKC_Gu9s1hw0v13OCgCpfsGtAY2hE7dujFqg8LNaK2I&e=): LLVM version 4.0.0svn Old stuff! ;-) Will change, but improving these messages should be on the radar, I think :-)Yep, agree, I think we need a generic, better solution for this type of issue instead of converting individual helpers to handle 0 min bound and then only bailing out in such case; need to brainstorm a bit on that. I think for the above in your case ... [...] 6: (85) call bpf_probe_read_str#45 7: (bf) r1 = r0 8: (67) r1 <<= 32 9: (77) r1 >>= 32 10: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+10 R0=inv(id=0) R1=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 11: (57) r0 &= 127 [...] ... the shifts on r1 might be due to using 32 bit type, so if you findWhere is it using a 32 bit type? Here is it again, now using clang 6: [root@jouet bpf]# trace -v -e *open,open.c usleep 2 bpf: builtin compilation failed: -95, try external compiler Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build unset env: KBUILD_OPTS include option is set to -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h set env: NR_CPUS=4 set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00 set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang unset env: CLANG_OPTIONS set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build set env: CLANG_SOURCE=/home/acme/bpf/open.c llvm compiling command template: $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o - libbpf: loading object 'open.c' from buffer libbpf: section .strtab, size 103, link 0, flags 0, type=3 libbpf: section .text, size 0, link 0, flags 6, type=1 libbpf: section prog=do_sys_open filename, size 168, link 0, flags 6, type=1 libbpf: found program prog=do_sys_open filename libbpf: section .relprog=do_sys_open filename, size 16, link 8, flags 0, type=9 libbpf: section maps, size 16, link 0, flags 3, type=1 libbpf: section license, size 4, link 0, flags 3, type=1 libbpf: license of open.c is GPL libbpf: section version, size 4, link 0, flags 3, type=1 libbpf: kernel version of open.c is 40e00 libbpf: section .symtab, size 144, link 1, flags 0, type=2 libbpf: maps in open.c: 1 maps in 16 bytes libbpf: map 0 is "__bpf_stdout__" libbpf: collecting relocating info for: 'prog=do_sys_open filename' libbpf: relocation: insn_idx=13 libbpf: relocation: find map 0 (__bpf_stdout__) for insn 13 bpf: config program 'prog=do_sys_open filename' symbol:do_sys_open file:(null) line:0 offset:0 return:0 lazy:(null) parsing arg: filename into filename bpf: config 'prog=do_sys_open filename' is ok Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long) Using /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build/vmlinux for symbols Open Debuginfo file: /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build/vmlinux Try to find probe point from debuginfo. Matched function: do_sys_open [2a2e5f8] Probe point found: do_sys_open+0 Searching 'filename' variable in context. Converting variable filename into trace event. filename type is (null). Opening /sys/kernel/debug/tracing//README write=0 Found 1 probe_trace_events. Opening /sys/kernel/debug/tracing//kprobe_events write=1 Writing event: p:perf_bpf_probe/prog _text+2493856 filename=%si:x64 In map_prologue, ntevs=1 mapping[0]=0 libbpf: create map __bpf_stdout__: fd=3 prologue: pass validation prologue: fast path libbpf: load bpf program failed: Permission denied libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG --- libbpf: 0: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +104) 1: (b7) r2 = 0 2: (bf) r6 = r1 3: (bf) r1 = r10 4: (07) r1 += -128 5: (b7) r2 = 128 6: (85) call bpf_probe_read_str#45 7: (bf) r1 = r0 8: (67) r1 <<= 32 9: (77) r1 >>= 32
This shift is due to the return type of bpf_probe_read_str which is int. The compiler does a sign extension to get it to u64 type.
10: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+10
Since it is u64 type, the compiler uses "==" instead of ">".
R0=inv(id=0) R1=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 11: (57) r0 &= 127 12: (bf) r4 = r10 13: (07) r4 += -128 14: (bf) r1 = r6 15: (18) r2 = 0xffff9b56ca5a2a80 17: (18) r3 = 0xffffffff 19: (bf) r5 = r0
r5 = r0, and r0 is still possbily 0.
r0 = bpf_probe_read_str
...
r0 &= 127
...
The same symptom as "int len" type.
20: (85) call bpf_perf_event_output#25 invalid stack type R4 off=-128 access_size=0 libbpf: -- END LOG -- libbpf: Loading the 0th instance of program 'prog=do_sys_open filename' failed libbpf: failed to load program 'prog=do_sys_open filename' libbpf: failed to load object 'open.c' bpf: load objects failed event syntax error: 'open.c' \___ Kernel verifier blocks program loading (add -v to see detail) Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf trace [<options>] [<command>] or: perf trace [<options>] -- <command> [<options>] or: perf trace record [<options>] [<command>] or: perf trace record [<options>] -- <command> [<options>] -e, --event <event> event/syscall selector. use 'perf list' to list available events Opening /sys/kernel/debug/tracing//kprobe_events write=1 Opening /sys/kernel/debug/tracing//uprobe_events write=1 Parsing probe_events: p:perf_bpf_probe/prog _text+2493856 filename=%si:x64 Group:perf_bpf_probe Event:prog probe:p Writing event: -:perf_bpf_probe/prog [root@jouet bpf]# /usr/local/bin/clang --version clang version 6.0.0 (https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__llvm.org_git_clang.git&d=DwIDAw&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=lALOhwxSDXp7fA6co6UyLBnLfqv0e2pf97GCuu5hGSw&s=FGoodXMmAdx4dqZJtvq6Vosu03to1-GFIRbagBiz0fg&e= 56cc8f8880db2ebc433eeb6b6a707c101467a186) (https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__llvm.org_git_llvm.git&d=DwIDAw&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=lALOhwxSDXp7fA6co6UyLBnLfqv0e2pf97GCuu5hGSw&s=_pQdnamFeu6n_um7WGrLwaCMtXqIVGLLEmYbcss_0aU&e= 3656d83960a4f3fedf6d8f19043abf52379f78c3) Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /usr/local/bin [root@jouet bpf]# cat open.c #include "bpf.h" SEC("prog=do_sys_open filename") int prog(void *ctx, int err, const char __user *filename_ptr) { char filename[128]; u64 len = bpf_probe_read_str(filename, sizeof(filename), filename_ptr); if (len > 0) perf_event_output(ctx, &__bpf_stdout__, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, filename, len & (sizeof(filename) - 1)); return 1; } [root@jouet bpf]#quoted
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a way to avoid these and have the test on r0 directly, we might get there. Perhaps keep using a 64 bit type to avoid them. It would be useful to propagate the deduced bound information back to r0 when we know that neither r0 nor r1 has changed in the meantime.It is tricky to do in the bpf_program. Compiler tries hard to optimize :-). The issue is at "r0 &= 127". 9: (6d) if r1 s> r0 goto pc+10 R0=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff)) R1=inv1 R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 10: R0=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffffffffffff)) R1=inv1 R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 10: (57) r0 &= 127 11: R0=inv(id=0,umax_value=127,var_off=(0x0; 0x7f)) R1=inv1 R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 One possible solution for this problem is to relax the arg4 type from ARG_CONST_SIZE to ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO.Yeah, I know, that's what I mentioned earlier in this thread to resolve it, but do we really want to add this hack everywhere? :( Potentially any function having ARG_CONST_SIZE would need to handle size 0 and bail out again in their helper implementation and it ends up that progs start relying on this runtime check where we won't be able to get rid of it later on anymore.quoted
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index a5580c6..a68d8bd 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_perf_event_output, struct pt_regs *, regs, struct bpf_map *, map, }, }; + if (unlikely(size == 0)) + return 0; + if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_INDEX_MASK))) return -EINVAL;@@ -407,7 +410,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_perf_event_output_proto = { .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, - .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE, + .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, };