Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important

On 6/11/2017 11:30 PM, Emil Lenngren wrote:

2017-06-11 22:48 GMT+02:00 Emmanuel Grumbach [off-list ref]:

quoted

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

"Jason A. Donenfeld" [off-list ref] writes:

quoted

Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.

Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?

While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html

Sorry for the stupid question, but the MAC address is in plaintext in
the air anyway or easily accessible via user space tools. I fail to
see what it is so secret about a MAC address in that code where that
same MAC address is accessible via myriads of ways.

I think you're mixing up Media Access Control (MAC) addresses with
Message Authentication Code (MAC). The second one is a cryptographic
signature of a message.

While this may be obvious to those who are in the know this mixup is 
easily made outside the crypto domain and especially in the (wireless) 
networking domain (my mind wandered towards the same error path). As 
this series is touching stuff outside crypto it is good to be explicit 
and not use such abbreviations that can be misinterpreted. The article 
Kees referred to is also useful to get into the proper context here and 
at least worth mentioning this or other useful references in the cover 
letter.

Regards,
Arend
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