Re: net/packet: use-after-free in packet_rcv_fanout
From: Eric Dumazet <hidden>
Date: 2017-02-10 03:19:30
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On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 17:24 -0800, Cong Wang wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 5:14 AM, Dmitry Vyukov [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Hello, I've got the following use-after-free report in packet_rcv_fanout while running syzkaller fuzzer on linux-next e3e6c5f3544c5d05c6b3b309a34f4f2c3537e993. So far it happened once and is not reproducible, but maybe the stacks will allow you to figure out what happens. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3212/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3224 at addr ffff8801d903d538 Read of size 8 by task syz-executor1/10596 CPU: 1 PID: 10596 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170208 #1 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x29/0x30 mm/kasan/report.c:332 __lock_acquire+0x3212/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3224 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3a/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:175 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline] packet_rcv_has_room+0x25/0xb0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1308 fanout_demux_rollover+0x3bb/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1388 packet_rcv_fanout+0x674/0x800 net/packet/af_packet.c:1490 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x73a/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:1898 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:2870 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xab0 net/core/dev.c:2890 __dev_queue_xmit+0x16d1/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3355 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3388 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] dst_neigh_output include/net/dst.h:452 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x1461/0x2380 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123 ip6_finish_output+0x2f9/0x950 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:149 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip6_output+0x1cb/0x8c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:163 ip6_xmit+0xc2f/0x1e80 include/net/dst.h:498 inet6_csk_xmit+0x320/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 tcp_transmit_skb+0x1ab4/0x3460 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1054 tcp_send_syn_data net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3343 [inline] tcp_connect+0x11a7/0x2f50 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3375 tcp_v6_connect+0x1a6e/0x1f70 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:295 __inet_stream_connect+0x2d1/0xf80 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:618 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen net/ipv4/tcp.c:1110 [inline] tcp_sendmsg+0x23ac/0x3bd0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1133 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1685 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1653 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2It seems on-flying packets could still refer the struct sock pointer via f->arr[i], if so we need a sync before unlinking it:diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index d56ee46..8724a98 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c@@ -2924,6 +2924,8 @@ static int packet_release(struct socket *sock) sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1); preempt_enable(); + synchronize_net(); + spin_lock(&po->bind_lock); unregister_prot_hook(sk, false); packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
More likely the bug is in fanout_add(), with a buggy sequence in error case, and not correct locking. kfree(po->rollover); po->rollover = NULL; Two cpus entering fanout_add() (using the same af_packet socket, syzkaller courtesy...) might both see po->fanout being NULL. Then they grab the mutex. Too late...