Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-23 18:19:47
Also in:
linux-crypto, lkml
On 23.12.2016 17:42, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 8:23 AM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 3:59 AM, Daniel Borkmann [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 12/23/2016 11:59 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:quoted
On Fri, 2016-12-23 at 11:04 +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:quoted
On 12/22/2016 05:59 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:quoted
On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 08:07 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:[...]quoted
quoted
quoted
The hashing is not a proper sha1 neither, unfortunately. I think that is why it will have a custom implementation in iproute2?Still trying to catch up on this admittedly bit confusing thread. I did run automated tests over couple of days comparing the data I got from fdinfo with the one from af_alg and found no mismatch on the test cases varying from min to max possible program sizes. In the process of testing, as you might have seen on netdev, I found couple of other bugs in bpf code along the way and fixed them up as well. So my question, do you or Andy or anyone participating in claiming this have any concrete data or test cases that suggests something different? If yes, I'm very curious to hear about it and willing fix it up, of course. When I'm back from pto I'll prep and cook up my test suite to be included into the selftests/bpf/, should have done this initially, sorry about that. I'll also post something to expose the alg, that sounds fine to me.Looking into your code closer, I noticed that you indeed seem to do the finalization of sha-1 by hand by aligning and padding the buffer accordingly and also patching in the necessary payload length. Apologies for my side for claiming that this is not correct sha1 output, I was only looking at sha_transform and its implementation and couldn't see the padding and finalization round with embedding the data length in there and hadn't thought of it being done manually. Anyway, is it difficult to get the sha finalization into some common code library? It is not very bpf specific and crypto code reviewers won't find it there at all.Yes, sure, I'll rework it that way (early next year when I'm back if that's fine with you).Can we make it SHA-256 before 4.10 comes out, though? This really looks like it will be used in situations where collisions matter and it will be exposed to malicious programs, and SHA-1 should not be used for new designs for this purpose because it simply isn't long enough. Also, a SHA-1 digest isn't a pile of u32s, so u32 digest[...] is very misleading. That should be u8 or, at the very least, __be32. I realize that there isn't a sha-256 implementation in lib, but would it really be so bad to make the bpf digest only work (for now) when crypto is enabled? I would *love* to see the crypto core learn how to export simple primitives for direct use without needing the whole crypto core, and this doesn't seem particularly hard to do, but I don't think that's 4.10 material.I'm going to try to send out RFC patches for all of this today or tomorrow. It doesn't look bad at all.
Factoring out sha3 to lib/ and use it as standalone and in crypto api doesn't seem hard, yep. I also proposed this to Daniel offlist. Bye, Hannes