Re: [PATCH v2] audit: use proper refcount locking on audit_sock
From: Richard Guy Briggs <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-13 14:56:02
Also in:
lkml
On 2016-12-12 15:58, Cong Wang wrote:
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 2:03 AM, Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Resetting audit_sock appears to be racy. audit_sock was being copied and dereferenced without using a refcount on the source sock. Bump the refcount on the underlying sock when we store a refrence in audit_sock and release it when we reset audit_sock. audit_sock modification needs the audit_cmd_mutex. See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/26/232 Thanks to Eric Dumazet [off-list ref] and Cong Wang [off-list ref] on ideas how to fix it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <redacted> --- There has been a lot of change in the audit code that is about to go upstream to address audit queue issues. This patch is based on the source tree: git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit#next --- kernel/audit.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index f20eee0..439f7f3 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c@@ -452,7 +452,9 @@ static void auditd_reset(void) struct sk_buff *skb; /* break the connection */ + sock_put(audit_sock);Why audit_sock can't be NULL here?
Fixed.
quoted
audit_pid = 0; + audit_nlk_portid = 0; audit_sock = NULL; /* flush all of the retry queue to the hold queue */@@ -478,6 +480,12 @@ static int kauditd_send_unicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (rc >= 0) { consume_skb(skb); rc = 0; + } else { + if (rc & (-ENOMEM|-EPERM|-ECONNREFUSED)) {Are these errno's bits??
No, I've fixed this silly error.
quoted
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); + auditd_reset(); + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); + } } return rc;@@ -579,7 +587,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) auditd = 0; if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) { + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); auditd_reset(); + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); reschedule = 0; } } else@@ -594,7 +604,9 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) auditd = 0; if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) { kauditd_hold_skb(skb); + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); auditd_reset(); + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); reschedule = 0; } else /* temporary problem (we hope), queue@@ -623,7 +635,9 @@ quick_loop: if (rc) { auditd = 0; if (AUDITD_BAD(rc, reschedule)) { + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); auditd_reset(); + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); reschedule = 0; }@@ -1004,17 +1018,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return -EACCES; } if (audit_pid && new_pid && - audit_replace(requesting_pid) != -ECONNREFUSED) { + (audit_replace(requesting_pid) & (-ECONNREFUSED|-EPERM|-ENOMEM))) { audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 0); return -EEXIST; } if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF) audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1); - audit_pid = new_pid; - audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid; - audit_sock = skb->sk; - if (!new_pid) + if (new_pid) { + if (audit_sock) + sock_put(audit_sock); + audit_pid = new_pid; + audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid; + sock_hold(skb->sk);Why refcnt is still needed here? I need it because I removed the code in net exit code path.
Because there is a chance that auditd exits abnormally and no message is send from the kauditd thread to discover it has gone.
quoted
+ audit_sock = skb->sk; + } else { auditd_reset(); + } wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait); } if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {@@ -1283,8 +1302,11 @@ static void __net_exit audit_net_exit(struct net *net) { struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); struct sock *sock = aunet->nlsk; - if (sock == audit_sock) + if (sock == audit_sock) { + mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);You need to put the if check inside the mutex too. Again, this could be removed if you use refcnt.
Ok, right, fixed. That last patch was a bit of a mess! Thanks for your patience in checking it...
quoted
auditd_reset(); + mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); + } RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL); synchronize_net(); -- 1.7.1
- RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635