On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 3:34 PM, Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:

On 14/09/2016 20:43, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

quoted

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

A Landlock program will be triggered according to its subtype/origin
bitfield. The LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SECCOMP value will trigger the
Landlock program when a seccomp filter will return RET_LANDLOCK.
Moreover, it is possible to return a 16-bit cookie which will be
readable by the Landlock programs in its context.

Are you envisioning that the filters will return RET_LANDLOCK most of
the time or rarely?  If it's most of the time, then maybe this could
be simplified a bit by unconditionally calling the landlock filter and
letting the landlock filter access a struct seccomp_data if needed.

Exposing seccomp_data in a Landlock context may be a good idea. The main
implication is that Landlock programs may then be architecture specific
(if dealing with data) as seccomp filters are. Another point is that it
remove any direct binding between seccomp filters and Landlock programs.
I will try this (more simple) approach.

Yeah, I would prefer that the seccomp code isn't doing list management
to identify the landlock hooks to trigger, etc. I think that's better
done on the LSM side. And since multiple seccomp filters could trigger
landlock, it may be best to just leave the low 16 bits unused
entirely. Then all state management is handled by the landlock eBPF
maps, not a value coming from seccomp that can get stomped on by new
filters, etc.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security