Re: README: [PATCH RFC 11/11] net/mlx5e: XDP TX xmit more

On Mon, 12 Sep 2016 12:56:28 -0700
Alexei Starovoitov [off-list ref] wrote:

On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 01:30:25PM +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:

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On Thu, 8 Sep 2016 23:30:50 -0700
Alexei Starovoitov [off-list ref] wrote:
  

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On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 07:36:52AM +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:  

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Imagine you have packets intermixed towards the stack and XDP_TX. 
Every time you call the stack code, then you flush your icache.  When
returning to the driver code, you will have to reload all the icache
associated with the XDP_TX, this is a costly operation.    

[...]  

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To make further progress in this discussion can we talk about
the use case you have in mind instead? Then solution will
be much clear, I hope.  

The DDoS use-case _is_ affected by this "hidden" bulking design.

Lets say, I want to implement a DDoS facility. Instead of just
dropping the malicious packets, I want to see the bad packets.  I
implement this by rewriting the destination-MAC to be my monitor
machine and then XDP_TX the packet.  

not following the use case. you want to implement a DDoS generator?
Or just forward all bad packets from affected host to another host
in the same rack? so two servers will be spammed with traffic and
even more load on the tor? I really don't see how this is useful
for anything but stress testing.

As I wrote below, the purpose of the monitor machine is to diagnose
false positives.  If you worry about the added load I would either,
forward out another interface (which is not supported yet) or simply do
sampling of packets being forwarded to the monitor host.

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In the DDoS use-case, you have loaded your XDP/eBPF program, and 100%
of the traffic is delivered to the stack. (See note 1)  

hmm. DoS prevention use case is when 99% of the traffic is dropped.

As I wrote below, until the DDoS attack starts, all packets are
delivered to the stack.

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Once the DDoS attack starts, then the traffic pattern changes, and XDP
should (hopefully only) catch the malicious traffic (monitor machine can
help diagnose false positive).  Now, due to interleaving the DDoS
traffic with the clean traffic, then efficiency of XDP_TX is reduced due to
more icache misses...



Note(1): Notice I have already demonstrated that loading a XDP/eBPF
program with 100% delivery to the stack, actually slows down the
normal stack.  This is due to hitting a bottleneck in the page
allocator.  I'm working removing that bottleneck with page_pool, and
that solution is orthogonal to this problem.  

sure. no one arguing against improving page allocator.

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 It is actually an excellent argument, for why you would want to run a
DDoS XDP filter only on a restricted number of RX queues.  

no. it's the opposite. If the host is under DoS there is no way
the host can tell in advance which rx queue will be seeing bad
packets.

Sorry, this note was not related to the DoS use-case.  You
misunderstood it.

-- 
Best regards,
  Jesper Dangaard Brouer
  MSc.CS, Principal Kernel Engineer at Red Hat
  Author of http://www.iptv-analyzer.org
  LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/brouer