Re: net/sctp: use-after-free in __sctp_connect
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Date: 2016-01-21 17:37:41
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On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:18:18PM -0200, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote:
On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:38:54AM -0500, Vlad Yasevich wrote:quoted
On 01/15/2016 02:01 PM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote:quoted
On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:52:31AM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:quoted
Hello, The following program causes use-after-free in __sctp_connect:...quoted
INFO: Freed in sctp_association_put+0x150/0x250 age=0 cpu=3 pid=15267 [< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 mm/slub.c:2678 [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2833 [< none >] kfree+0x2a8/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:3662 [< inline >] sctp_association_destroy net/sctp/associola.c:424 [< none >] sctp_association_put+0x150/0x250 net/sctp/associola.c:860 [< none >] sctp_wait_for_connect+0x37c/0x4f0 net/sctp/socket.c:7067^^^^^^^^^^^^^^quoted
[< none >] __sctp_connect+0x905/0xb90 net/sctp/socket.c:1215 [< none >] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x198/0x1d0 net/sctp/socket.c:1328 [< inline >] sctp_setsockopt_connectx net/sctp/socket.c:1360 [< none >] sctp_setsockopt+0x226/0x3630 net/sctp/socket.c:3728 [< none >] sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2642 [< inline >] SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1752 [< none >] SyS_setsockopt+0x158/0x240 net/socket.c:1731 [< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185This one may sher some light on that other socket leak one, because the association shouldn't have been freed at that point. Now, how it managed to unbalance that refcnt, hmm...The free may be a result of implicit close when the program ends. If the thread is still waiting for connect to finish when the program ends, we may end up in a situation when the association has been freed, but the ref held by wait_for_connect prevents the destruction. When wait_for_connect finishes in puts the ref and causes the destruction.That could be it, yes.quoted
What I am guessing is happing is the wait_for_connect doesn't catch the error condition correctly and thus __sctp_connect() doesn't think there was and error and references the assoc which was just destroyed.Perfect. There is another thing that this program exploits that, in this case, leads to this. It's creating a tcp-style socket, calling connect() on it in one thread and sendto() to a different peer in the main thread probably while the connect is still in progress. Seems that can lead to one having two assocs on a tcp-style socket, because we don't check if we the socket has associations but if it's in established state. I don't see the checks on sctp_sendmsg() protecting from this case. 2511 14:55:10 socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3 <0.000366> 2511 14:55:10 mmap(0x20000000, 65536, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x20000000 <0.000082> 2511 14:55:10 bind(3, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(13280), inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &sin6_addr), sin6_flowinfo=1882116169, sin6_scope_id=3305060172}, 28) = 0 <0.000119> - bound to IPv6 2511 14:55:10 mmap(NULL, 8392704, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_STACK, -1, 0) = 0x7f52f9e75000 <0.000084> 2511 14:55:10 brk(0) = 0x1cf8000 <0.000065> 2511 14:55:10 brk(0x1d19000) = 0x1d19000 <0.000079> 2511 14:55:10 brk(0) = 0x1d19000 <0.000064> 2511 14:55:10 mprotect(0x7f52f9e75000, 4096, PROT_NONE) = 0 <0.000091> 2511 14:55:10 clone(child_stack=0x7f52fa674ff0, flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_FS|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_SYSVSEM|CLONE_SETTLS|CLONE_PARENT_SETTID|CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID, parent_tidptr=0x7f52fa6759d0, tls=0x7f52fa675700, child_tidptr=0x7f52fa6759d0) = 2512 <0.000211> 2511 14:55:10 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, {onoff=6, linger=0}, 8 <unfinished ...> 2512 14:55:10 set_robust_list(0x7f52fa6759e0, 24 <unfinished ...> 2511 14:55:10 <... setsockopt resumed> ) = 0 <0.000135> 2512 14:55:10 <... set_robust_list resumed> ) = 0 <0.000133> 2511 14:55:10 sendfile(3, 3, [0], 192 <unfinished ...> 2512 14:55:10 connect(3, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(13273), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 128 <unfinished ...> - connect to IPv4. This connect should timeout, as we can't find a route between ipv4/ipv6. - no packet is sent due to this 2511 14:55:10 <... sendfile resumed> ) = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek) <0.000146> 2511 14:55:10 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, [CHLD], [], 8) = 0 <0.000066> 2511 14:55:10 rt_sigaction(SIGCHLD, NULL, {SIG_DFL, [], 0}, 8) = 0 <0.000065> 2511 14:55:10 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, [], NULL, 8) = 0 <0.000067> 2511 14:55:10 nanosleep({4, 0}, 0x7ffffd73eee0) = 0 <4.000258> - added a sleep(4) to make this more evident 2511 14:55:14 sendto(3, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\335\1\370\375\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"..., 112, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(13276), inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &sin6_addr), sin6_flowinfo=3512421652, sin6_scope_id=4260889053}, 128) = 112 <0.001601> - sendto() to an IPv6 addr while connect() is still running. - socket is not in established state. - assoc is not a peeled off, as we can't find a transport using this tuple - so this new assoc ends up being allowed under a tcp-style socket - nobody is listening on 13276. An ABORT is sent back 2512 14:55:14 <... connect resumed> ) = -1 ECONNREFUSED (Connection refused) <4.003595> - And suddenly the connect() is confused and thinks the error was for it, exact after sendto() auto-association noticed the error. - Funny thing is, as sendto() thinks it succeeded, as connect() already consumed the error via sctp_error(). If the program was ending and if the threads awakening were the other way around, e.g. if connect() had started a bit after sendto(), connect() probably would have thought it succeeded, and referenced the freed memory.
Hmm connect() doesn't have to start after sendto(), no, as they are waiting on different wq. Seems it has to wake the connect thread via sctp_write_space() or sctp_wake_up_waiters(), via sctp_wfree(), which is set as destructor upon sctp_sendmsg(). So when that chunk is freed, the connect() returns, seems to make sense to me.
I'm thinking we should add a function to better identify busy sockets such as this. Like in __sctp_connect(), issuing connect()s in parallel will also fool current checks. Thoughts? Marcelo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html