On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 01:26:42PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Tycho Andersen
[off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
This patch adds a way for a process that is "real root" to access the
seccomp filters of another process. The process first does a
PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FD to get an fd with that process' seccomp filter
attached, and then iterates on this with PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEXT_FILTER using
bpf(BPF_PROG_DUMP) to dump the actual program at each step.
Why is this a new ptrace interface instead of a new seccomp interface?
I would expect this to only be valid for "current", otherwise we could
run into races as the ptracee adds filters. i.e. it is not safe to
examine seccomp filters from tasks other than current.
same question.
I thought we discussed to add a command to seccomp() syscall for that?