On 15/05/16, Paul Moore wrote:

On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 10:46 AM, Eric W. Biederman
[off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

Paul Moore [off-list ref] writes:

quoted

On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 5:46 AM, Daniel J Walsh [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On 05/15/2015 05:05 PM, Paul Moore wrote:

quoted

On Thursday, May 14, 2015 11:23:09 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote:

quoted

On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 7:32 PM, Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On 15/05/14, Paul Moore wrote:

quoted

* Look at our existing audit records to determine which records should
have
namespace and container ID tokens added.  We may only want to add the
additional fields in the case where the namespace/container ID tokens are
not the init namespace.

If we have a record that ties a set of namespace IDs with a container
ID, then I expect we only need to list the containerID along with auid
and sessionID.

The problem here is that the kernel has no concept of a "container", and I
don't think it makes any sense to add one just for audit.  "Container" is a
marketing term used by some userspace tools.

I can imagine that both audit could benefit from a concept of a
namespace *path* that understands nesting (e.g. root/2/5/1 or
something along those lines).  Mapping these to "containers" belongs
in userspace, I think.

It might be helpful to climb up a few levels in this thread ...

I think we all agree that containers are not a kernel construct.  I further
believe that the kernel has no business generating container IDs, those should
come from userspace and will likely be different depending on how you define
"container".  However, what is less clear to me at this point is how the
kernel should handle the setting, reporting, and general management of this
container ID token.

Wouldn't the easiest thing be to just treat add a containerid to the
process context like auid.

I believe so.  At least that was the point I was trying to get across
when I first jumped into this thread.

It sounds nice but containers are not just a per process construct.
Sometimes you might know anamespace but not which process instigated
action to happen on that namespace.

quoted

From an auditing perspective I'm not sure we will ever hit those

cases; did you have a particular example in mind?

The example that immediately came to mind when I first read Eric's
comment was a packet coming in off a network in a particular network
namespace.  That could narrow it down to a subset of containers based on
which network namespace it inhabits, but since it isn't associated with
a particular task yet (other than a kernel thread) it will not be
possible to select the precise nsproxy, let alone the container.

paul moore

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs [off-list ref]
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
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