On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 12:46:37PM +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote:
On 04/01/2014 12:30 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
quoted
Looking down the problem, it seems the problem is that the strlen in
strlcpy
could read beyond the input buffer?
To prevent this problem in other parts of the kernel wouldn't it be better
to
replace the strlen with strnlen in strlcpy?
Sorry, I should have included the link to the previous thread:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/3/7/712
I only resent (adding netdev to Cc) to get this into David Miller's
patch queue.
Ah ok, sorry I don't follow lkml as closely as netdev@.
As you can see from the previous discussion, we _could_ change the Linux
kernel's definition of strlcpy(), but I wouldn't recommend it for the
following reasons:
1. Both BSD man page and BSD implementation _require_ the source string
to be 0-terminated. Changing the semantics of strlcpy() in the Linux
kernel would probably be a bad idea and cause even more confusion that
what we already have.
Sure, we shouldn't change the documented semantics. If at all it would
be an additional safety net. Your patch would still be needed.
2. Even if we changed strlcpy() to use strnlen(), it would still be
unsafe if the source string is not 0-terminated and the source buffer is
shorter than the destination buffer. That's because the size passed to
strlcpy() is conceptually the length of the _destination_ buffer, not
the source string.
Ack.
I'm not against changing strlcpy() per se (changing to strnlen() might
be a performance improvement), but we shouldn't use that as an excuse to
use the interface incorrectly.
I am totally with you there.
Actually in some cases it could hinder finding such bugs as we're more
unlikely to hit a RED_ZONE which should crash the kernel (I actually
think crashes to find such bugs are good). But I guess the propability
is pretty high to hit another NUL byte before that and if at that point a
RED_ZONE is mapped.
Thanks,
Hannes