From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <redacted>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 21:07:25 +0100

On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 01:04:25PM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:

quoted

I really tried hard to find alternatives or even a way to enable
the protection automatically given that at least unbound does apply
IP_PMTUDISC_DONT to its sockets already. These are the reasons why I
came up with the new IP_PMTUDISC_INTERFACE value:

Sorry to bother you but I would really love to hear your feedback on my
reasoning so I can try to come up with a solution you would be happy with.

All I've read is that administrators cannot be relied upon to
configure their systems properly for the requirements they have.

And that is a non-argument for adding this new socket option as far as
I'm concerned.

"I strongly do not trust path MTU information" has a scope as small as
a route or an interface, it doesn't go down to the socket or
application level at all.

Please stop pretending that it does.