On 2/25/2013 1:05 PM, Paul Moore wrote:

On Monday, February 25, 2013 10:02:42 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:

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On 2/25/2013 8:55 AM, Paul Moore wrote:

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[NOTE/WARNING: we're veering away from the VSOCK discussion and towards a
LSM stacking discussion; see my response to Gerd if you want to stay on
topic.]> 
On Saturday, February 23, 2013 03:43:23 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:

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On 2/22/2013 4:45 PM, Paul Moore wrote:

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On Friday, February 22, 2013 03:00:04 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:

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Please add an LSM blob. Please do not use a secid. I am currently
battling with secids in my efforts for multiple LSM support.

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I am going to be able to deal with secids for AF_INET only because
SELinux prefers XFRM, Smack requires CIPSO, and AppArmor is going to
be willing to have networking be optional.

"prefers"?  Really Casey, did you think I would let you get away with
that statement?  What a LSM "prefers" is really not relevant to the
stacking effort, what a LSM _supports_ is what matters.

I suppose. My point, which you may refute if it is incorrect,
is that there are common, legitimate SELinux configurations which
eschew Netlabel in favor of XFRM.

There are common, legitimate use cases which use exclusively NetLabel,
exclusively labeled IPsec, and both.  A LSM stacking design that forces
SELinux to only operate with XFRM (labeled IPsec) is wrong.  If you are
giving admins the ability to selectively stack LSMs you should also allow
them to selectively pick which non-shareable functionality they assign to
each LSM.

That is the approach I'm taking. The kernel configuration
will specify which LSM gets Netlabel and which gets XFRM.

Okay, it wasn't obvious to me in your previous emails that this was the case. 
Also, just so I'm clear, you configure the stacking and the stacked network 
access controls at the same time, yes?  I want to avoid the situation where 
the stacked network access controls are determined at build time and the LSM 
stacking order/configuration is determined at boot.

The set of LSMs, the order they are invoked, which LSM
uses /proc/.../attr/current and which LSM uses Netlabel,
XFRM and secmark are all determined by Kconfig. You can
specify a limited set of LSMs using security= at boot,
but not the networking configuration.

Tetsuo is lobbying for loadable security modules. I am
doing my best to leave everything in a state where some
soul braver than I might pick that up after I'm done.
I do not have any intention of supporting on the fly
or heuristically determined networking.

 

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If you want to try option #3 I think we might be able to do something
with NetLabel to support multiple LSMs as the label abstraction stuff
should theoretically make this possible; although the NetLabel cache
will need some work.

It is reasonably easy to restrict Netlabel to a single LSM,
and since SELinux seems better served by XFRM in most configurations ...

I disagree.  In some use cases SELinux is better served by XFRM, in others
it is better served by NetLabel.  Once again, I think you need to focus
on what is possible with the LSMs rather than a particular set of use
cases which happen to make the LSM stacking project easier.

I'm trying not to make too many architectural changes to the
code around the LSM mechanism itself. I don't see that as cost
effective or likely to be popular. If the implication of that is
that there are certain configurations that are unsupportable but
that have plausible alternatives I think it will do for phase I.

That statement is vague enough that I can't really say yes or no to it, but I 
will stick by my previous comments about the network access controls.

Ah. I want to create a useful system. I want to create it
reasonably short order. I am willing to forgo supporting
some configuration options to reduce the project time. In
particular, I hope to avoid mucking up other people's code
as that is a sure fire way to bog a project down.

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Options I have considered include:
	- Netlabel support for discriminating LSM use by host,
	
	  just as it currently allows for unlabeled hosts.

Hmm, interesting ... not sure what I think of this.

It breaks down on 127.0.0.1. Otherwise is looks pretty easy to do.

When I said I wasn't sure what I thought of this, it was more along the lines 
of I'm not sure if it makes sense, not that it would be difficult to do.

It makes sense if you're in a network environment with heterogeneous
legacy multilevel secure systems and you want some of those machines
to talk to SELinux controlled processes and others to talk to Smack
controlled processes. That is unlikely to be an industry dominating
scenario.

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	- secid maps.

Can you elaborate on this?  I can think of a few different meanings here
...

This fell out of my first shot at stacking, the one that never saw
the light of day for tax reasons. I had implemented a stacker LSM
that slid into the existing infrastructure. Hooks that asked for
secids got the secid from my LSM, not the underlying LSM secids.
There was a table much like the Smack label list that mapped the
global secids to sets of underlying secids. The obvious problem
is that that table grows quickly and can never go away.

Interesting idea, but I can imagine it gets rather intrusive very quickly.

That's one way to describe it. I'm striving to avoid it.