[PATCH 03/14] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns
flat view
STALE5569d
REVIEWED: 1 (1M)
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Date: 2011-07-26 18:58:50
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Subsystem:
keys/keyrings, security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
Status: Reviewed.
1 review trailer (1 from subsystem maintainers).
From: Serge E. Hallyn <redacted>
ATM, task should only be able to get his own user_ns's keys
anyway, so nsown_capable should also work, but there is no
advantage to doing that, while using key's user_ns is clearer.
changelog: jun 6:
compile fix: keyctl.c (key_user, not key has user_ns)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <redacted>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <redacted>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index eca5191..fa7d420 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) ret = -EACCES; down_write(&key->sem); - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */ if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid) goto error_put;
@@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm) down_write(&key->sem); /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) { + if (ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + key->uid == current_fsuid()) { key->perm = perm; ret = 0; }
--
1.7.4.1