Re: [RFC] procfs: add hidepid and hidenet modes

On Sun, Jun 12, 2011 at 14:12 +0300, Alexey Dobriyan wrote:

On Sun, Jun 12, 2011 at 11:51:01AM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:

quoted

hidenet means /proc/PID/net will be accessible to processes with
CAP_NET_ADMIN capability or to members of a special group.

gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
and network connections info.

Similar features are implemented for old kernels in -ow patches (for
Linux 2.2 and 2.4) and for Linux 2.6 in -grsecurity (but both of them
are implemented as configure options, not cofigurable in runtime).


In current version hidenet works for CONFIG_NET_NS=y via creating a
"fake" net namespace and slipping it to nonauthorized users, resulting
in users observing blank net files (like nobody use the network).  If
CONFIG_NET_NS=n I don't see anything better than just fully denying
access to /proc/<pid>/net.  More elegant ideas are welcome.

This fake netns concept is ugly.
If you wan't deny something, why don't you return -E?

Sorry, I should have mentioned it.  It's a workaround.  The thing is
that /proc/net/* is so core and existed for a long time that some
programs might be confused if these files are missing or if open()
returns -EXXX.  netstat handles this and outputs smth like "Networking
was disabled in your kernel", which is a bit confusing.  Also I saw some
programs didn't handle missing files at all, I recall brctl sigfaulted
when he couldn't access some sysfs file.

As fake_net doesn't break something, but instead keeps some
compatibility with old programs, why don't use it?

BTW, there is no fake_net in -ow or -grsecurity.  I thought it might be
helpful for upstream in sense of compatibility.

Regardless, these should be separate patch from PID stuff.

No problem.

Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments