Re: [Security] inet_diag insufficient validation?
From: Eugene Teo <hidden>
Date: 2011-06-03 06:55:45
Cc'ed acme. On Wed, Jun 1, 2011 at 11:40 PM, Dan Rosenberg [off-list ref] wrote:
It seems to me that the auditing performed by inet_diag_bc_audit() is insufficient to prevent pathological INET_DIAG bytecode from doing bad things. Firstly, it's possible to cause an infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit() with a INET_DIAG_BC_JMP opcode with a "yes" value of 0. The valid_cc() function, also called from here, seems suspicious as well. Once the bytecode is actually run in inet_diag_bc_run(), it looks like more infinite loops are possible, if appropriate "yes" or "no" values are set to zero and weren't validated by the audit. Finally, I can't seem to find any validation that the reported length of the netlink message header doesn't exceed the skb length, as checked in some other netlink receive functions, which could result in reading beyond the bounds of the socket data. I could just be missing something here though. Regards, Dan _______________________________________________ Security mailing list Security@linux.kernel.org http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/security