Re: [PATCH] wireless: fix 64K kernel heap content leak via ioctl
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2010-08-27 21:45:10
Also in:
linux-wireless, lkml
Hi Jean, On Fri, Aug 27, 2010 at 02:22:54PM -0700, Jean Tourrilhes wrote:
On Fri, Aug 27, 2010 at 02:02:41PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:quoted
This problem was originally tracked down by Brad Spengler. When calling wireless ioctls, if a driver does not correctly validate/shrink iwp->length, the resulting copy_to_user can leak up to 64K of kernel heap contents. It seems that this is triggerable[1] in 2.6.32 at least on ath5k, but I was not able to track down how. The twisty maze of ioctl handlers stumped me. :)You can always ask.quoted
Other drivers I checked did not appear to have any problems, but the potential remains. I'm not sure if this patch is the right approach; it was fixed differently[2] in grsecurity.Did you tried your patch for real ? With large scan request ? I ask because at first glance, it looks incorrect, asI believe it kills large request. But someone would need to test, for sure.
I did not, no. Since I couldn't reproduce the original problem (I lacked the hardware to test ath5k, and all the other drivers correctly managed iwp->length).
quoted
[1] http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2290&start=0 [2] http://grsecurity.net/~spender/wireless-infoleak-fix2.patchI believe this patch would make the situation worse. Would you mind validating the following patch ? I've just verified that it compiles and I believe it does what you are asking in a much more predictable way.
- if (copy_to_user(iwp->pointer, extra,
- iwp->length *
- descr->token_size)) {
+ /* Verify how much we should return. Some driver
+ * may abuse iwp->length... */
+ if((iwp->length * descr->token_size) < extra_size)
+ extra_size = iwp->length * descr->token_size;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(iwp->pointer, extra, extra_size)) {The comment should probably be clarified -- it's the caller's iwp->length that may be causing problems (when combined with a driver that forgets to adjusted iwp->length downward). Regardless, the above patch would appear to limit the copy_to_user to only the kzalloced region. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team