Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
From: Samir Bellabes <hidden>
Date: 2010-03-06 18:16:30
Also in:
lkml, netfilter-devel
Subsystem:
security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
Possibly related (same subject, not in this thread)
- 2010-03-15 · Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls · Samir Bellabes <hidden>
- 2010-03-07 · Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls · Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
- 2010-03-07 · Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls · Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
- 2010-03-06 · Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls · Samir Bellabes <hidden>
- 2010-03-06 · Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls · Samir Bellabes <hidden>
Tetsuo Handa [off-list ref] writes:
Regarding [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core
+static __init int snet_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_debug("initializing: event_hash_size=%u "
+ "verdict_hash_size=%u verdict_delay=%usecs "
+ "default_policy=%s\n",
+ snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
+ snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
Why not to stop here if snet_evh_size == 0 or snet_vdh_size == 0 in order to
avoid "division by 0".indeed. I applied this patch
From 593614c92a1f2058c014fa674c67f434b24b26e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samir Bellabes <redacted> Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2010 17:32:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] snet: adding checks for bad configuration values this patch adds some checks on boot parameters and runtime configurations for: - snet_verdict_policy, snet_verdict_delay and snet_vdh_size - snet_evh_size - snet_ticket_delay and snet_ticket_mode Noticed by Tetsuo Handa [off-list ref] Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <redacted> --- include/linux/snet.h | 1 + security/snet/snet_core.c | 6 ++++++ security/snet/snet_event.c | 6 ++++++ security/snet/snet_netlink.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- security/snet/snet_ticket.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/snet/snet_verdict.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/snet.h b/include/linux/snet.h
index 739601d..e6e2d52 100644
--- a/include/linux/snet.h
+++ b/include/linux/snet.h@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum snet_ticket_mode { SNET_TICKET_OFF = 0, SNET_TICKET_FIX, SNET_TICKET_EXTEND, + SNET_TICKET_INVALID, }; /* genetlink commands */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_core.c b/security/snet/snet_core.c
index 9f2eb2e..949ecaa 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_core.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_core.c@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ static __init int snet_init(void) snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay, snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy)); + if (snet_verdict_policy >= SNET_VERDICT_INVALID) { + printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_policy\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto event_failed; + } + ret = snet_event_init(); if (ret < 0) goto event_failed;
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
index 5f708d0..5693aac 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_event.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c@@ -165,6 +165,12 @@ int snet_event_init(void) { int err = 0, i = 0; + if (snet_evh_size == 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_evh_size value\n"); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + snet_evh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_evh_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!snet_evh) {
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
index b0dd163..937b0fc 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c@@ -363,25 +363,38 @@ out: static int snet_nl_config(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) { - int ret = -EINVAL; + int ret = 0; atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq); if (info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]) { - snet_verdict_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]); + unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]); + if (new == 0) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + snet_verdict_delay = new; pr_debug("snet_nl_config: verdict_delay=%u\n", snet_verdict_delay); - ret = 0; } if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]) { - snet_ticket_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]); + unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]); + if (new == 0) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + snet_ticket_delay = new; pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_delay=%u\n", snet_ticket_delay); - ret = 0; } if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]) { - snet_ticket_mode = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]); + unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]); + if (new >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + snet_ticket_mode = new; pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_mode=%u\n", snet_ticket_mode); - ret = 0; } +out: return ret; }
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
index 62ced7b..80a1b0f 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ int snet_ticket_init(void) struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL; + if (snet_ticket_mode >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) { + printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_mode\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if ((snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_FIX || + snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_EXTEND) && + (snet_ticket_delay == 0)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_delay\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_task_security), GFP_KERNEL); if (tsec == NULL) return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
index 480a7f8..ba35d19 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c@@ -156,6 +156,18 @@ int snet_verdict_init(void) { int err = 0, i = 0; + if (snet_vdh_size == 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_vdh_size value\n"); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (snet_verdict_delay == 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_delay value\n"); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + snet_vdh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_vdh_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!snet_vdh) {
--
1.6.3.3