On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 08:22:01AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:

On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:05 PM Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 04:27:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

quoted

Like, couldn't just the entire thing just be:

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a320371899cf..0ab18e19f5da 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c

@@ -2849,6 +2849,13 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
              break;
      }

+     if (unlikely(mask & MAY_OPENEXEC)) {
+             if (sysctl_omayexec_enforce & OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT &&
+                 path_noexec(path))
+                     return -EACCES;
+             if (sysctl_omayexec_enforce & OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE)
+                     acc_mode |= MAY_EXEC;
+     }
      error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
      if (error)
              return error;

FYI, I've confirmed this now. Effectively with patch 2 dropped, patch 3
reduced to this plus the Kconfig and sysctl changes, the self tests
pass.

I think this makes things much cleaner and correct.

I think that covers inode-based security modules but not path-based
ones (they don't implement the inode_permission hook).  For those, I
would tentatively guess that we need to make sure FMODE_EXEC is set on
the open file and then they need to check for that in their file_open
hooks.

Does there need to be an FMODE_OPENEXEC, or is the presence of
FMODE_OPEN with FMODE_EXEC sufficient?

-- 
Kees Cook