On Tue, 12 Jul 2016 13:25:11 -0300
Thiago Jung Bauermann [off-list ref] wrote:

Hi Eric,

I'm trying to understand your concerns leading to your nack. I hope you 
don't mind expanding your thoughts on them a bit.

Am Dienstag, 12 Juli 2016, 08:25:48 schrieb Eric W. Biederman:

quoted

AKASHI Takahiro [off-list ref] writes:

quoted

Device tree blob must be passed to a second kernel on DTB-capable
archs, like powerpc and arm64, but the current kernel interface
lacks this support.

This patch extends kexec_file_load system call by adding an extra
argument to this syscall so that an arbitrary number of file descriptors
can be handed out from user space to the kernel.

See the background [1].

Please note that the new interface looks quite similar to the current
system call, but that it won't always mean that it provides the "binary
compatibility."

[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2016-June/016276.html

So this design is wrong.  The kernel already has the device tree blob,
you should not be extracting it from the kernel munging it, and then
reinserting it in the kernel if you want signatures and everything to
pass.

I don't understand how the kernel signature will be invalidated. 

There are some types of boot images that can embed a device tree blob in 
them, but the kernel can also be handed a separate device tree blob from 
firmware, the boot loader, or kexec. This latter case is what we are 
discussing, so we are not talking about modifying an embedded blob in the 
kernel image.

quoted

What x86 does is pass it's equivalent of the device tree blob from one
kernel to another directly and behind the scenes.  It does not go
through userspace for this.

Until a persuasive case can be made for going around the kernel and
probably adding a feature (like code execution) that can be used to
defeat the signature scheme I am going to nack this.

I also don't understand what you mean by code execution. How does passing a 
device tree blob via kexec enables code execution? How can the signature 
scheme be defeated?

I'm not an expert on DTB, so I can't provide an example of code
execution, but you have already mentioned the /chosen/linux,stdout-path
property. If an attacker redirects the bootloader to an insecure
console, they may get access to the system that would otherwise be
impossible.

In general, tampering with the hardware inventory of a machine opens up
a security hole, and one must be very cautious which modifications are
allowed. You're giving this power to an (unsigned, hence untrusted)
userspace application; Eric argues that only the kernel should have
this power.

Just my two cents,
Petr T