[PATCH v2 08/10] KVM: nVMX: Don't flush shadow VMCS12 to guest memory during vCPU teardown

From: Jim Mattson <redacted>

When a vCPU is destroyed while L2 is active, KVM synthesizes a nested
VM-Exit, which flushes the cached shadow VMCS12 back to guest memory:

  vmx_vcpu_free()
  |-> nested_vmx_free_vcpu()
      |-> vmx_leave_nested()
          |-> nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0)
              |-> nested_flush_cached_shadow_vmcs12()
                  |-> kvm_write_guest_cached()
                      |-> __copy_to_user(ghc->hva, ...)

Accessing user memory via a memslot during VM destruction is broken, as
there are no guarantees that current->mm == kvm->mm when the VM is dying,
because the last reference to the VM can be put from a different process
than the original creating processes.

And even if the original process does put the final reference, during
process exit, do_exit() calls exit_mm() before closing file descriptors, so
vCPU destruction runs with current->mm == NULL on a borrowed lazy TLB
active_mm.  If the borrowed address space has a writable mapping at the
to-be-written userspace address, KVM will corrupt an unrelated task's
memory since uaccess APIs, including __copy_to_user(), don't sanity check
current->mm (and *can't* sanity perform KVM's current->mm == kvm->mm check
since that is firmly a KVM-only concept).

Hack-a-fix the nVMX flow even though KVM now protects against bad uaccess
reads/writes in the core APIs, as doing so will allow adding even more
sanity checks in KVM's APIs to help detect other buggy code.  Add a TODO to
call out that checking if KVM can do a uaccess for the VM is a hack; nVMX
really needs to stop abusing __nested_vmx_vmexit() when destroying a vCPU.

Fixes: 61ada7488ffd ("KVM: nVMX: Cache shadow vmcs12 on VMEntry and flush to memory on VMExit")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <redacted>
[sean: key off __kvm_can_do_uaccess(), add TODO]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 7 ++++++-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h  | 8 ++++++--
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 151873407abd..8e31eba4d9fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c

@@ -5134,8 +5134,13 @@ void __nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
 		 * Otherwise, this flush will dirty guest memory at a
 		 * point it is already assumed by user-space to be
 		 * immutable.
+		 *
+		 * TODO: Drop the explicit check on being able to access guest
+		 *       memory once KVM no longer abuses the nested VM-Exit
+		 *       flow when destroying a vCPU.
 		 */
-		nested_flush_cached_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
+		if (__kvm_can_do_uaccess(vcpu->kvm))
+			nested_flush_cached_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * The only expected VM-instruction error is "VM entry with

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 0ee81754d730..0c58a4945595 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h

@@ -1350,10 +1350,14 @@ int kvm_write_guest_offset_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
 int kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
 			      gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len);
 
+static __always_inline __must_check bool __kvm_can_do_uaccess(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return current->mm == kvm->mm && refcount_read(&kvm->users_count);
+}
+
 static __always_inline __must_check bool kvm_can_do_uaccess(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	return !WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm != kvm->mm ||
-			     !refcount_read(&kvm->users_count));
+	return !WARN_ON_ONCE(!__kvm_can_do_uaccess(kvm));
 }
 
 #define BUILD_KVM_COPY_USER_WRAPPER(fn, to_user, from_user)				\

-- 
2.56.0.rc1.315.gc6ed9934b7-goog